Krishnan Srinivasan, in review of Prof GL Peiris’s New Book on the Events, in Daily Mirror, 17 August 2026… with highlights imposed by the Editor —with explicit hesitations expressed regarding the degree to which he is in command of facts and situations
G.L.Peiris has been a minister, was a member of parliament, and led the Sri Lanka Government’s side during the talks with the Tamil LTTE from 2002 to 2004 to end the civil war. Accordingly, his narrative is authoritative and invaluable.
Starting in 1994 with Prime Minister Chandrika Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka and continued by Ranil Wickremesinghe, the process begun in 1999, facilitated by Norway, went through six discussions in 2002/3 in Thailand, Norway, Germany and Japan. These discussions terminated after the tsunami of 2004 and civil war resumed until LTTE was defeated in 2009.
The LTTE regarded the discussions as a pathway to international acceptance, and was insincere in exploration of federalism, and the government lacked resolve to depart from the constitutional unitary state. The process excluded vital stakeholders from the Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim communities. The process was vitiated by the president and prime minister in Colombo acting at cross purposes.
Economic considerations were given weight, foreign aid regarded as essential, and resettlement prioritized over constitutional and political issues. This sequencing put the cart before the horse.
The dilemma of three main island communities was considered as early as 1926 and concluded, ‘federalism as the only solution to our political problem.’ The demand for devolution and power-sharing led to communal tension, terrorism and secession claims by LTTE despite the constitution prescribing a unitary state. When Chandrika’s exchanges with LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran led nowhere, she invited Norway in 1999 to facilitate a dialogue. Peiris carefully eschews any critique of India, but in fact, Delhi was agnostic if not hostile to any external involvement in Sri Lanka.
Chandrika wished to win Tamils over by devolution and humanitarian means; the government continued to send construction material, and salaries to public officials, in LTTE-controlled areas. Her aim was to alienate the people of the north and east from LTTE, whereas Ranil regarded LTTE as a partner to find solutions, using foreign aid and relief to establish trust and a peace dividend. A ceasefire agreement (CFA) was signed in February 2002 although Chandrika as president in charge of armed forces, refused to lift the LTTE’s proscribed status. Ranil however agreed to allow LTTE to particulate in talks on the theoretical basis of equality.
Negotiations begin
Peiris notes that ‘the same cluster of issues was taken up with unbroken monotony but increased vehemency’ during the talks. Three subcommittees met ‘in an atmosphere of rapidly declining confidence’, the differing emphases of president and prime minister – though in terms of conviction, they did not differ on the goal of an equitable constitutional devolution of powers – meant that the war impinged on party politics in the government. Chandrika was kept inadequately informed and the army commander was adamant his withdrawal from high security areas was dependent on LTTE abandoning heavy weaponry. ‘Adversarial politics trumped’ national priorities, the CFA did not succeed because lines of control were undefined and maritime conflict excluded. Arms reached LTTE by sea, it press-ganged child soldiers, and its cadres roamed the north and east in the guise of ‘political work’. The Monitoring Mission (MM) was impotent while Muslims and LTTE’s opponents were victims of the greatest violence. The MM was unable to act with even minimal efficacy. Less than 25 officers were available, unarmed, hardly trained, without uniforms, ignored human rights issues and tilted towards LTTE.
Maritime issues were combustible, mainly because this route was the main conduit for LTTE’s arms supplies ‘notwithstanding the patent untenability’ of their assertion to ‘operate at sea on equal terms’. With the CFA and MM providing no clarity, the government navy experienced ‘profound disenchantment’. With public trust turning hostile, Colombo had to face the possibility of LTTE abandoning the talks, leading to a worse crisis. Media and civil society management during the process was defective, and while Peiris uses temperate language, it is clear the Norwegian facilitation inclined to treating LTTE as an equal sovereign party, which encouraged its case for separate nationhood.
The subcommittee on humanitarian and rehabilitation proved a ‘profound disappointment’ and collapsed even before the peace process, although the government was eager to provide relief to LTTE-controlled areas. The presumed international financial support was mainly illusory. Both sides were under financial strain while LTTE’s nominees toured the globe under Norwegian sponsorship. LTTE’s priority was de-escalation and professed humanitarian concerns while coercing civilians and consolidating authority over much of the north and east. After the Twin Towers attack of 9/11 (2001), and aversion to terror groups, it derived respectability from the ongoing peace process.
Norway
Norway as facilitator was accepted by both contending parties, but had no international mandate. The line between mediation and facilitation was blurred and could be ‘carried to the extent of withholding from the facilitator all creativity.’ Whether on seating plans, flags or other protocols, Norway showed pro-LTTE bias; Peiris cites communication equipment for LTTE being imported by the Norwegian Embassy using diplomatic privilege.
The 2002 Oslo talks represented the high point of expectation, when Norway summarised that the parties agreed to explore a solution based on internal self-determination for Tamil-speaking people based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka, acceptable to all communities. But exploring implied no commitment and secession was still LTTE’s objective. The process was running into sand, LTTE negotiator Balasingham’s contact with Prabhakaran was eroding, the Tamil diaspora was critical of anything short of independence, and LTTE remained bent on military victory.
The peace process became problematic for Norway when dealings with terrorists was discouraged after 9/11. Feeling isolated, Norway was inconsistent in the roles of facilitator and enforcer, and sought to dilute involvement by enlisting western powers and Nordics even as its objectivity began called in question. It never grasped 4 the nettle by issuing any ultimatum. Despite 9/11, USA remained involved, perhaps due to Ranil’s commitment to private enterprise, but by then only ‘a miniscule minority’ in Sri Lanka believed that ‘international involvement served the national interest.’
Human Rights and Muslims
International support depended on attention to human rights, but Prabhakaran was blatantly authoritarian, which meant failure to extract meaningful action from LTTE. Press-ganging child soldiers was a case in point; LTTE’s military ‘had to be preserved at all cost.’ With gender issues, ‘distance between formal procedures and reality on the ground’ were conspicuous.
Muslims being a majority in two eastern districts, could also claim a Muslim homeland and participate in the peace process, but LTTE regarded them as collaborators and Norway was unhelpful. Contacts between Prabhakaran and Muslim leaders led to little progress though the Oluvil Declaration of 2003 made the case for Muslims of the North and East as a separate nation. By dealing with LTTE without government as intermediary Muslims were able to extract concessions, though violence against them continued till 2006 though their credibility, like LTTE’s later, was crippled by internal dissension.
International aspects
India was ‘more important than any other country’ when it came to Sri Lanka, and its attitude towards LTTE hardened along with Tamil Nadu’s, after Rajiv Gandhi’s 1991 murder. It avoided such pressure on Colombo as would drive Sri Lanka towards China. When war resumed in 2026 [???] Japan did not join the west in criticizing Sri Lanka. Russia and China also supported Sri Lanka when Peiris notes the bias and ‘betrayal of principles’ by the UN Human Rights Commission and Council towards Sri Lanka’s government.
Ranil placed stress on the international dimension of the peace process because of its traction with liberal western economies and access to financial resources. The assumption that better economic conditions would facilitate political decisions was misplaced. His stress on an international safety net, blending with his views on privatization, proved controversial as economic hardships alienated the public mind from the peace process.
The western response was initially enthusiastic and donor meetings in 2003 at Tokyo and Washington were encouraging. LTTE was equally keen as it needed to be seen as a provider of material needs to Tamils, but soon began to accuse the international community as concerting with Colombo to exert pressure. In government circles the feeling grew that the influence of international actors was excessive.
Resort to the IMF led to deeply unpopular austerity measures and eroded public confidence in the peace process, while benefits reaching LTTE areas through government agencies led to LTTE ‘painting as bleak a picture as possible.’ Aid was an important necessity but NGOs of dubious character and mandate provoked debates around accountability and alienation from indigenous values.
An ‘interim structure’ for rehabilitation, reconstruction, confidence building and attracting aid was considered from the outset but ‘the fundamental problem’ was LTTE’s objective to secure complete control over all institutions in the north and east. In 2023 it presented its plan, probably devised by the Tamil diaspora that envisaged its total control over eight districts. To Norwegian surprise, this was summarily rejected by Peiris supported by Chandrika, who dissolved parliament in 2004.
LTTE wanted to consolidate its power without commitment to pluralism or democracy. The CFA brought in some illusory tranquility, but degenerated into unbridled violence by LTTE whose attacks on Buddhists and dissident Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas in the east continued unabated. With central issues unaddressed, the process fell into irrelevance. The Tamils then split, with Prabhakaran challenged in the east by Karuna his erstwhile lieutenant.
Tsunami
In December 2004 a tsunami devastated mainly LTTE-held areas. LTTE knew this paved the way to financial resources and talks resumed. Muslims constituted over half the displaced, and had to be represented. International sources offered support, and various empowered committees, funding and a ceasefire were discussed, but the Sri Lanka Supreme Court struck down aspects of the arrangements. LTTE lost confidence and the peace process terminated.
END NOTES
Some points need mention on the book’s production. The copy editing is excellent, as is the author’s elegant phrasing and shafts of alleviant humour. Describing the twists and turns of a lengthy failed peace process presents a formidable task. Peiris tries to marry chronological narration with analysis but without total success, resulting in overlaps and repetitions. The lack of maps is sorely felt; also a table of acronyms – sometimes as many as three or four to a page. The timeline of events, frequently consulted, should have appeared at the start and not the conclusion of the text. The use of Mr and other honorifics is inconsistent besides being otiose.
Peiris is a significant personage in Sri Lanka, and his epitaph on the peace process is telling. The war ended with LTTE’s defeat but ‘it would be idle to pretend it brought closure to the issues the war had been about.’
The author of the article is Krishnan Srinivasan, Former Foreign Secretary of India and Former Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth
Vijitha Yapa Publications, Colombo, 2026, pp 425
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