Hiran Halangode, ….. with highlighting within the text being impositions from the Editor, Thuppahi
In dedication to the First Gemunu Watch: I dedicate this article to all those valiant officers and men of the 1st Battalion the Gemunu Watch (1GW) who served with me during my tenure of command from 01 December 1988 to 31 January 19991. They served with me loyally, with dedication and commitment in Hambantota, Moneragala, Ampara and Batticaloa districts against all odds. They strove hard, made supreme sacrifices and suffered humiliation at times to safeguard Sri Lanka as a unitary state. This essay is written without fear or favour, with malice to none and magnanimity to all.
Pic from lefantasist.blogspot.com
With the departure of the IPKF in end March 1990 the LTTE gradually took control of the North-East of Sri Lanka. They positioned their cadres in vital areas that enabled them to exert pressure on the Police who maintained law and order and the Army who were very thinly deployed in the Northeast. In the Eastern province one Infantry Battalion was deployed in each of the districts of Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee.
In Batticaloa five Army detachments were established. They were at Wellawadi, Kiran, Kalawanchikudy, Kalmunai and Kallady. Out of these detachments, Kalmunai and Kalawanchikudy detachments belonged to 6th Bn Sri Lanka Light Infantry (6 SLLI) which were just raised in late May 1990. The Infantry Battalions were handicapped, as they had to shed one Rifle Coy and composite platoons to raise another Infantry Battalion in late May 1990. The troops had to re-orientate themselves from a low intensity environment in the South to a high intensity environment in the North and East. However 1 GW had already prepared themselves during their tenure of 10 months at Ampara where they saw the LTTE annihilate the TNA with the withdrawal of the IPKF. They had saved some of the TNA (viz., the Tamil National Army – ex-members of EPRLF/ENDLF) cadres who fled the LTTE attacks into Ampara. They were armed by the IPKF who wanted them to be their proxy, although not included in the infamous Indo Lanka peace agreement. This is for the attention of the numerous Indian military experts and the more radical TNA politicians who speak about genocide.
The 1GW was re-deployed in Batticaloa on 18 May 1990. By then the situation was very tense in the whole district. The LTTE obstructed the movement of the Security Forces, interfered with the Police in maintaining law and order and had more than 30-40 small outposts with bunkers manned by 150-400 LTTE cadres in the BCO town and vicinity. A large bunker covered the approach into Batticaloa town under the clock tower across the lagoon facing the Batticaloa Police station. LTTE permission was required to visit most areas in town, where a concentration of more than 30 LTTE outposts had come up. They reserved the use of certain garages and service stations exclusively for themselves.
This situation was brought to the notice of the military higher command and the civilian bureaucracy who were negotiating with the LTTE at that time. But the Security Forces were explicitly told to co-operate with the LTTE to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict as the country couldn’t afford another battle with the LTTE. The President and the civilian bureaucracy did not know the ground situation, whilst the military higher command did not put across the difficulties faced by the Security Forces on the ground to the powers that be prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Their interest was continuation in office.
On 11 June 1990 hostilities commenced in BCO with the LTTE taking the Security Forces by total surprise. The previous night a Sinhalese woman was caught by her husband when she was with a Muslim youth (an LTTE supporter) who was a tailor. The two males engaged in fisticuffs and both were brought to the Batticaloa police station. The LTTE, who were looking for an opportunity to commence their campaign of violence, surrounded the Batticaloa police station and demanded the release of the Muslim youth. When the Police indicated that the youth was admitted to the Batticaloa hospital the LTTE said that the youth was not in the hospital and further demanded his release. It was later revealed that the LTTE had abducted this youth from the hospital. They then disarmed the policemen on guard and took over the police station, with its armoury, communications, gold and money which was kept for safe custody.
I was the Commanding Officer of the 1GW and the Co-ordinating Officer of the Batticaloa District at the Kallady Camp (approximately 2 kms away from the Batticaloa Police Station). I had taken up duties in BCO from Ampara. The Police did not inform me about the situation. The owner of the “L H Bakery” one of my school time friends informed me by telephone at 6.20 a.m. on 11 June 1990, that all the Sinhalese in the town were informed by the LTTE to vacate the area within five minutes. Since I was not informed of the situation in BCO town prior to this message, I had sent two of my platoons (two officers and sixty soldiers) to Ampara for AWTC (Annual Weapon Training Classification) firing at 4.00 a.m. on 11 June 1990.
At around 7.30 a.m. on the same day I was told a vehicle sent out from Kalawanchikudy Army camp (6 SLLI troops) had been ambushed at Kalmunai and all ten soldiers who had travelled in the vehicle had been killed. Kalawanchikudy Army Camp, to whom these soldiers belonged, had only 48 troops excluding the three officers. There was no way of moving out to Kalmunai to recover the dead of the patrol as the main road was blocked by the LTTE. The LTTE had taken up a position by then around the Kalawanchikudy Camp and the Police Station. (The police station was just opposite the camp on the Ampara–Batticaloa road). Having surrounded the camp and the police station they demanded their surrender, and also announced that they will not be harmed and will be handed over to the Sri Lankan Government at the Batticaloa airfield. Ten Sinhalese policemen jumped over to the Army Camp with their weapons and ammunition and joined the troops. Captain Sarath Embowa of the 6 SLLI was the Officer Commanding the Kalawanchikudy Camp and decided to fight the terrorists.
The LTTE who were in touch with the BCO Air Force base informed them that if the Police surrendered without resistance they would hand them over to the Government. The Police who were not prepared mentally and physically and had no confidence to fight a ruthless guerrilla organisation without air and artillery support agreed to surrender to the LTTE. By this time the LTTE had surrounded all the Police Stations in BCO and Ampara Districts and had captured the Policemen who surrendered with their weapons without a fight. All of them were brutally murdered in cold blood. The tragic fate of 677 Sinhalese and Muslim policemen who surrendered should be a grim reminder to all concerned of the LTTE atrocities committed during this conflict.
At 3.30 p.m. on the same day the Army Commander Lt. Gen. H Wanasinghe, the Inspector General of Police, a senior officer from the Air Force and Director Operations of the Army Brig Vijaya Wimalaratne arrived at Batticaloa Air Force base by air. I and the Senior Superintendent of Police for Batticaloa and one ASP (living within Kallady camp) were heli-lifted from Kallady camp to join them for a quick conference. When I reached the Batticaloa SLAF base the policemen, their families and the Sinhala civilians had all gathered at the airport premises and were awaiting evacuation to Colombo. Getting through this crowd of emotionally devastated, highly charged, tensed and angry personnel was a trying task because the Tamil SSP was their target. He happened to be following immediately behind me. Fortunately no untoward incident took place. We had our meeting and returned to Kallady camp .The possibilities of reinforcing the Police stations were discussed. At that moment there was no way of reinforcing the police stations as the Army too were very thin on ground and the security of the army camps too were in great danger due to them being deployed far apart without mutual support from one another. No artillery was available in Batticaloa district and the only available Bell 212 helicopter was not fitted with guns. (To fit the guns it would have taken about one to two hours).
On returning to camp from the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) base at BCO at around 6.00 pm on 11 June 1990 the LTTE contacted me at Kallady and told me to inform Kiran (Kumburumulla) camp to surrender in five minutes and if it was disregarded, they were going to launch an all-out attack on the camp. The LTTE had started their attack on Kiran and Wellawadi at 4.30 p.m. In order to buy more time and avoid being found fault with for starting the war, I said that I would inform them of instructions after contacting the President.
I then contacted my Brigade Commander in Ampara who responded evasively. Then I contacted the Division Commander at Anuradhapura. He insisted that the Army should fight till the last man and the last round and that the entire country was depending on our performance in Batticaloa. I requested him for immediate assistance to evacuate the camps at Wellawadi and Kalmunai since they had only depleted platoons in each one of them.
Meanwhile, all four camps in the Batticaloa District and Kalmunai Camp in the Ampara District were under severe attack. Wellawadi camp was established to provide protection to the Sinhala fishing community (about 350 fishermen, women and children) who had been living there for generations. 2/Lt RMCC Ranaweera (left the Army in 1991) and 22 men fought for more than 36 hours supported by two 81mm Mortars (from Kiran detachment) against more than 300-400 LTTE cadres throughout the night with 90 rounds of ammunition (first line scale). The troops were able to protect the families and evacuate them by sea with the assistance of the Sri Lanka Navy, in a gunboat ina gunboat commanded by Thisara Samarasinghe [subsequently rising to position of Admiral and Commander of SLN] on 12 June 1990. (It is still difficult to imagine how one gunboat evacuated over 350 innocent civilians). It must be mentioned that there was not a single civilian casualty in the entire evacuation at Wellawadi except for one mother and a child who were drowned while boarding the naval craft. The troops were provided ammunition from Kallady, which was delivered by the helicopter on the morning of 12 June 1990, before they withdrew on the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) gunboat to Trincomalee. They suffered only one minor injury to a soldier due to LTTE fire during the entire crisis.
The situation at Kalmunai too was similar, the platoon under 2/Lt KASH Karunatillake SLLI was under tremendous pressure as intense fire was brought down on them by the LTTE. However, on 13 June 1990 the Sri Lanka Navy gunboat under the command of Cdr Daya Dharmapriya [now a retired Rear Admiral] and support vessels evacuated them after an agonizing battle aided also by artillery fire from the Malwatte Army camp. However, they suffered more casualties as the evacuation was done whilst in contact with the LTTE.
The LTTE unleashed salvos of mortar, small arms and 84mm rocket launcher fire at the Kiran Camp. The Officer Commanding the camp, Captain Sumith Perera GW, and his second in command Lieutenant Chinthaka Munasinghe GW (both officers were killed in action in subsequent operations conducted against the LTTE in Jaffna in 1995 and Mannar in 1991 respectively) with their men valiantly held the camp against all odds. The only surviving officer is 2/Lt Suminda Jayasundera (now a retired Lt Col. domiciled in the USA )) who was a YO with less than one year service with the unit. The LTTE even used chlorine gas against the troops in Kiran on 16 June 1990. It must also be mentioned that Pte Dharmasiri K.A. the radio operator of ‘A’ Company 1 GW maintained contact with Battalion Head Quarters (HQ) at Kallady and rear HQ at Diyatalawa throughout the entire period during day and night. When the antenna was damaged due to intense mortar fire he fixed it at night by climbing a Palmyra tree. On the night of 11 June 1990 the Air Force helicopter fitted with machine guns became airborne to provide close air support. The services provided by Flying Officer Thilana Kaluarachchi (This officer was later killed when a missile hit the MI 24 he was flying over Kokilai Lagoon in 1997) were outstanding. He relentlessly flew the entire night and continued every night till the detachment was relieved and gave the much needed air support, which was a tremendous morale booster to the besieged troops. The ground to air communications was closely co-ordinated through Cpl. Gamini of 1 GW who was stationed at the SLAF base at BCO, during this period.
On 16.06.1990 during the battle, a ceasefire was requested by the LTTE through the Bishop of Batticaloa so that both sides could attend to their respective casualties. However the LTTE leaders refused to disarm and stay put in the SLAF base in Batticaloa, but wanted to accompany the Bishop to Kiran with me or my representative. I refused to their terms which were clearly designed to take us hostage and overpower the detachment by holding us at gunpoint. The LTTE stooped to such cunning low levels and proved their perfidy, deceit and treachery throughout the conflict. They continued to bombard the troops psychologically by making announcements through a loudhailer asking the troops repeatedly to give up and surrender without fighting a losing battle. Troops returned fire and fought steadfastly and resolutely to deny the LTTE any opportunity to break into the camp.
The troops in all camps lived on liquids, raw papaws, palmyra fruits and the odd animal that strayed into camp during the siege. These foods were collected during the night or when there was a lull in the fighting. Since the well to the Kiran camp was exposed to LTTE fire, troops tunnelled into it at night and water was obtained for their survival. Troops in Kiran survived for 8 nights in one uniform amidst regular attacks by the LTTE during the day and night. The alertness of the sentry at one night point enabled him to wipe out an entire group of 9 LTTE guerrillas that were crawling into the camp by cutting the perimeter fence on 11th June 1990 night. Only 01 soldier was Killed In Action (KIA) after 8 days of fighting. However almost 60 soldiers of the 80 in the camp suffered injuries and were evacuated by 18 June 1990 when reinforcements arrived. The BBC correspondent refused to believe our casualties, as the surrounding area of the camp was full of dead and decomposed LTTE bodies (over 100) due to the fighting of over 8 days.
A rescue operation was finally launched under the command of GOC 1 Division Maj. Gen DL Kobbekaduwa. Before the rescue, Maj. Gen Kobbekaduwa spoke to me over the radio on 15 June 1990. The voice of the GOC was a great morale-booster to us who were all desperate about our survival. Until then the response from the military higher command was poor and little encouragement was provided to continue the fight.
The reinforcement operations were launched from the north of Batticaloa to relieve the Kiran Camp. 3 Brigade Group was commanded by Brigadier AMU Seneviratne and the 4th Battalion the Gemunu Watch and the 5th Battalion the Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment had to fight their way into, and reached Batticaloa by 19 June 1990.
The success of the 1 GW troops in the defence of their camps in the Batticaloa district was due to their comradeship, belief in their leadership and their determination to survive amidst all the confusion and chaos. The effort taken to send the remains (cremated at night with the help of Palmyra branches amidst LTTE fire) of the dead soldier at Kiran to his next of kin was greatly appreciated by his parents and was a great morale booster for the rest of the troops.
The world at large must note that soldiers fight for their survival first, then for their comrades, then for their Regiment, then for their Army and for their country, in that order of priority. Let the courageous stand taken by all those valiant and gallant men of Gemunu in Batticaloa in June 1990 in general, and Kiran in particular, be a defining and bold moment and tradition for all those who have served, continue to serve and are to serve in the Gemunu Watch to follow. This tradition must be upheld with pride.
Let the courageous stand taken by all those valiant Gemunu soldiers in BCO in June 1990 in general and Kiran especially be a proud moment for all those who have served, continue to serve and are to serve in the Army. Let us all rededicate our efforts to fight terrorism to the last and uphold Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, for the sake of the many youths who have sacrificed their today for our tomorrow. May we achieve lasting peace and safeguard our country for the future generations of all peace loving Sri Lankans from the ruthless LTTE guerrillas.
The single most important factor in developing the strength required to meet aggression is the attitude and will of our citizens. While the intensity of world tension may ebb and flow we must be prepared from a position of strength and sincerity – for a long campaign to achieve our quest of a lasting peace. We must have the will to win – to overcome the doubts, the fears and on the part of many, the complacency, and a lack of willingness to sacrifice. We must understand that we are not entitled to easy, automatic and perpetual freedom. General G. H. Decker, Chief of Staff – US Army – 1962.
** Brigadier (retd) Hiran N Halangode RWP, RSP, USP, USACGSC was the 13th CO of the 1st Gemunu Watch (1GW in shorthand); Past CO Cadet Training Wing and Deputy Commandant- KDA 06th Feb’ 91 – 10 Sep’ 93 and 25th Aug 92 – 10th Sep’ 93
 The Infantryman fights without promise of reward or relief.
Behind every river there’s another hill and behind that hill, another river. After weeks or months in the line only a wound can offer him the comfort of safety, shelter and a bed.
Those who are left to fight, fight on, evading death but knowing that with each day of evasion they have exhausted one more chance of survival sooner or later, unless victory comes this chance must end on the litter or in the grave.
General Omar Bradley
A NOTE from The EDITOR, THUPPAHI
The history of Sinhala-Tamil conflict since the 1950s has been marked by several atrocious moments, beginning with the mini-pogroms of 1958 and 1977 and the major one in July 1983. Once Tamil militancy took root in what many SL Tamils considered was a “war of liberation” killings and reprisals occurred from action by both sides. In the 1980s this extended to hostilities among the Tamil militant groups, especially in the Eastern Province. In the north, however, the LTTE secured a monopoly of violence by eliminating or squeezing out the other militant formations.
Thereafter, in late 1987 they took on the IPKF in resistance to the imperial overlordship guiding India’s intervention. Similar intent probably guided the misguided UNP politics in the south in 1989 which Hiran Halangode criticizes in this article as well as another essay entitled “Lest we Forget” in honour of the 1st Gemunu Watch (to be posted later).
Thus, the stark face of the conflict in the 1980s and 1990s is that neither any of the Tamil militant forces nor the various arms of the Sri Lankan security forces can be deemed innocent of atrocious killings directed against those captured in conflict; and others viewed as potential “terrorists” or “traitors” as the case may be. The Sinhalese and Muslim policemen, 678 in total, at the various stations who, with encouragement from Colombo, surrendered in June were all massacred by the LTTE (who were commanded by Karuna) though the Tamil policemen were –I believe –spared and even recruited into their services. Such ferocious acts of the LTTE in mid-1990 were answered in kind by the SL Army later that year as they proceeded to gain greater control of the Eastern Province.
From the historical and political point of view, therefore, this contribution is presented here as a tiny step that hopefully encourages some institution to sponsor a major bibliographical project that documents the publications on the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in all languages, especially English, Tamil and Sinhala. We today need to emulate that magnificent bibliographer of Ceyloniana, H. A. I. (Ian) Goonetileke, whose compendium of five volumes is a treasure trove for social science researchers.
This will be no small task: the internet has encouraged a monumental proliferation of articles, video clips and commentaries. Alas, any bibliographical survey has to gather the chaff with the wheat.
The Sri Lankan security forces had to face a wide range of challenges. Halangode’s essay details one at time when the SL army seems to have been ill-prepared for the challenges ahead. The death of Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Vijay Wimalaratne in a mine explosion in June 1992 was of momentous consequence. Poor military leadership became the norm in the mid-to late 1990s. It was the transformation of the different arms of the defence establishment in the 2000s that eventually provided the GSL forces with the capacity to outmanoeuvre the LTTE both on land and on sea. Till the mid-late 2000s, therefore the infantrymen had to display courage and ingenuity on several occasions to survive. Halangode’s account of such moments is therefore of some significance. The events he describes in 1990 serve as a precursor to the series of disasters suffered by the SL Army during Eelam War III (1995-2001) under the supreme command of Generals Ratwatte and Daluwatte.
ADDENDUM 29 March 2016
To avoid misunderstanding let me stress that any compendium on the ethnic conflict and the wars that were integral to it must include the verbal and other productions of the Tamil militant forces at such sites as TamilNet and Tamil sangam – supplemented by the more independent assessments of such observers as DBS Jeyaraj, KT Rajasingham and Sebastian Rasalingam.
Again, since Halangode’s essay highlights the bravery and ingenuity displayed by some of the GSL personnel at dire moments in 1990, one has to attend to the sacrificial commitment shown by many a Tiger fighter. Not all suicide attacks were on soft targets and civilians (and as such deemed atrocities). The suicide attacks were low cost precision weapons and the first at Nelliyadi in July 1987 was directed at a military camp – a legitimate target. Indeed, a high proportion of suicide attacks were at sea—carried out by the Sea Tigers.
This degree of commitment won the admiration of many Sri Lankan Tamils. From circa 1989 therefore, “the propaganda of the deed” was developed by the LTTE into “the propaganda of the dead.” Māvīrar Nāl on 27th November every year was fashioned as a massive homage that was at once a mobilization of the Tamil peoples for their “war of liberation.” It was monumentally effective. To comprehend its power students of nationalism and war must read the studies of pro-Tamil scholars such as Christiana Natali, Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Peter Schalk and Margaret Trawick – individuals with the linguistic skills that enhance the value of their work. Though lacking such capacities, my studies of this Tiger project of mobilization deployed anthropological approaches, comparative explorations into the world of the kamikaze and jihadists to study this phenomenon, as well as a foray into Kilinochchi in late November 2004 to witness the Māvīrar Nāl of that year –truly an unforgettable experience.
De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009d “Sri Lanka’s Experience in Counter-Insurgency Warfare,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, October 2009, pp. 40-46.
De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009e “Good education. Sri Lankan military learns insurgency lessons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2009, pp. 2-7.
De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009f “Maritime Counter-Terrorism and the Sri Lanka Navy,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, November 2009, 35: 32-33.
De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009g “Lessons in Maritime Counter-Insurgency,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, January 2010, 36: 50-53.De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010a “Information Warfare and the Endgame of the Civil War,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, May 2010, 30/4: 35-37, http://wwwasiapacificdefencereporter. com/articles/40/Sri-Lanka.
De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010b “Downfall of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 6 June 2010, http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=243\.
Goonetileke, H. A. I.: A Bibliography of Ceylon: a systematic guide to the literature on the land, people, history and culture published in Western languages from the sixteenth century to the present day. (Bibliotheca Asiatica, 5.) 2 vols.: [v], lxxx, 408 pp.; [v], ix, 409–865 pp. Zug, Switzerland: Inter Documentation Co. AG, .
Rajan Hoole: The Arrogance of Power, 2001
Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar 2005. “And Heroes Die: Poetry of the Tamil Liberation Movement in Northern Sri Lanka.” South Asia 28, no. 1: 112–153.Encompassing Empowerment | 105
Hudson, D. Dennis 1990. “Violent and Fanatical Devotion among the Nāyanārs: A Study in the Periya Purānam of Cēkkilār.” Pp. 373–404 in Criminal Gods and Demon Devotees, ed. Alf Hiltebeitel. Delhi: Manohar.
Jeyaraj, D. B. S. 2006. “No Public Speech Ceremony for LTTE Chief This Year?” Transcurrents, 26 November. http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/234.
Ralph Nugera: “Combat Training in the Sri Lank Army,” 26 February 2016, https://thuppahis.com/2016/02/26/combat-training-in-the-sri-lanka-army/
Roberts, Michael 1996 ‘Filial devotion and the Tiger cult of suicide’, Contributions to Indian, Sociology, 30: 245-72.
Roberts, Michael. 2005b. “Saivite Symbols, Sacrifice, and Tamil Tiger Rites.” Social Analysis 49, no. 1: 67–93.
Roberts, Michael. 2005c. “Tamil Tiger ‘Martyrs’: Regenerating Divine Potency?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28: 493–514.
Roberts, Michael. 2006. “Pragmatic Action and Enchanted Worlds: A Black Tiger Rite of Commemoration.” Social Analysis 50, no. 1: 73–102. 106 | Michael Roberts
Roberts, Michael. 2007b. “Suicide Missions as Witnessing: Expansions, Contrasts.”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 10: 857–887.
Roberts, Michael. 2008. “Tamil Tigers: Sacrificial Symbolism and ‘Dead Body Politics.’” Anthropology Today 24, no. 3: 22–23
Schalk, Peter 1997c “Historisation of the martial ideology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)”, South Asia, 20: 35-72.
Schalk, Peter 1997b “The revival of martyr cults among Ilavar,” Temenos: Studies in Comparative Religion 33 (1997): 151-190. Available at http://www.tamilcanadian.com/cgi-bin/php/page.php?index=307
Schalk, Peter 2003 ‘Beyond Hindu festivals: the celebration of Great Heroes’ Day by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) in Europe’, in Martin Baumann et al (eds.) Tempel und Tamilien in zweiter Heimat, Ergon Verlag, pp. 391-??.
Sivaram, D. P. 1992 ‘Tamil militarism – the code of suicide’, Lanak Guardian June 1992, 15: 13-16.
Tanaka, Masakazu 1991 Patrons, devotees and goddesses. Ritual and power among the Tamil fishermen of Sri Lanka, Kyoto: Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University.
Margaret Trawick: Enemy Lines. Warfare, Childhood and Play in Batticaloa, 2007, Uinversity of California Press.
Mark P. Whitaker: Learning Politics from Sivaram, 2007, Pluto Press.
UTHR SPECIAL REPORTS — see list in http://www.uthr.org/specialreport.htm
 See Hoole 2001; Trawick 2007; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prawn_farm_massacre; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalmunai_massacre; and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Batticaloa_massacre.
 See article by Nugera 2016 and the several by and de Silva-Ranasinghe.