The Dilemma surrounding Mattala Airport

Capt Gihan A Fernando …. an  article entitled “Mattala Airport: Wildlife and Posssible Solution” … with the highlighting here being the work of the author Gihan Fernando.

The Island of 20 May 2026 revealed the possible Indian investment in the ‘loneliest Airport In the world’.  Will the proverbial camel put its head inside the tent? This effort could be compared to flogging a dead horse!

That front page article by S Venkat Narayen mentions Mattala Airport being an ideal place for a flying school. The sad fact is that no wind pattern and turbulence studies have been carried out in the area. The turbulence is so great that even large passenger aircraft find the approach to land extremely turbulent.

The next page carried an article by Ifam Nizam, on the Human / Elephant conflict at Hambantota and that an’ Elephant Management Reserve’ is essential for Hambantota.  The real reason for that is no secret. It is due to the displacement of elephants from their natural surroundings.

Read the whole story of Matala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA) below . It is an extract from a book titled ‘From Nose to Tale’ By Captain Gihan A Fernando, published last year.

‘Mattala: A Mistake?’

“Many years ago, when an alternative international airport to Colombo-Bandaranaike International (BIA), Katunayake was mooted, the Air Ceylon Pilots’ Guild began lobbying for China Bay, Trincomalee. Among other considerations, it was pointed out that because Sri Lanka is subject to both the Southwest and Northeast monsoons, at each of those seasons the coast on the opposite ‘quadrant’ of the island would generally be experiencing good weather, and vice versa.

But the guild’s request came too late, as the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), which has a base at China Bay, had already stated that they had no objection for tall silos to be built at the site of the Prima flour mill, along the takeoff and landing paths of China Bay’s single runway.

Another site was then suggested, near Nilaveli, 20 miles north of Trincomalee. In the Seventies, Nilaveli was fast developing into a popular tourist location. But that idea for a new airport was also dropped when Eelam separatist rumblings first began as early as 1978 when an Air Ceylon HS 748 on the ground at Ratmalana Airport was destroyed by a terrorist’s bomb, fortunately without injuries to anyone or loss of lives (see Chapter 17).

The need for an alternative international airport in Sri Lanka was driven by a requirement by Ceylon’s then Air Navigation Regulations (ANR) for all airliners destined for BIA. In the event of being unable to land there for one reason or another, they must be carrying sufficient fuel to reach Madras (Chennai), the nearest ‘alternate’ to BIA that could accept large jets, plus fuel for another half-hour in the air. Establishment of a second international airport would obviate that burdensome necessity.

However, all aircraft ‘burn fuel to carry fuel’. For example, if an aircraft needed to have 10,000 kg of fuel onboard to comfortably reach BIA, based on flying time for that particular sector, the crew would have had to uplift 12,000 kg at the point of departure. Put simply, if a closer alternative airport was available, carrying less fuel would be a saving.

The ANRs of developed countries have been progressively updated to keep pace with advances in aviation, yet in Sri Lanka supplementary regulations to ANRs promulgated in 1955 remain in force.

When Air Lanka began operating Lockheed L-1011 TriStars, the first few were obtained from Canada. Accordingly, the airline followed operational procedures laid down by Air Canada in the Canadian operations manual. One such statement was that it was not necessary to always have fuel onboard to reach a designated alternate airport as it permitted the captain to arrive at the destination with a lesser amount of fuel, provided the destination airport predicted good weather and had at least two runways [author’s emphasis].

The theory behind the Canadians’ thinking was that even if one runway becomes unusable for whatever reason, a second was available as a fallback. Interestingly, even today, when a new airline requests permission from the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL) to operate to BIA, they must show that it can remove a disabled aircraft as soon as possible, so as not to obstruct the single runway leaving it unserviceable for an unduly protracted period.

When the runway at BIA was becoming outdated, having been constructed with Canadian aid and expertise in the late 1960s, it was decided that a new one should be constructed, this time with aid from Japan. The plan was for it to be built parallel to and north of the existing runway, with the latter narrowed and converted to a taxiway. That was when the Air Line Pilots’ Guild of Sri Lanka (ALPGSL) made representations to General D. Sepala Attygalle, secretary to the Ministry of Defence under whose purview Air Lanka was administered. They requested Attygalle to retain the old runway as a second runway, so that the requirement to carry extra fuel during times of good weather would no longer apply.

Separately, an expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) declared that the new and taller air traffic control tower was too close to the old runway, making its use illegal. On the other hand, what pilots wanted was a runway that would be used in ‘one-off’ situations, not on a regular basis. However, those plans didn’t proceed, and the status quo prevailed.

Another suggestion was for an international airport at Hingurakgoda, site of the present domestic and military Minneriya airfield. With Australian financial aid promised, there was a strong possibility of that proposition becoming reality. In fact, Singapore Airlines began drawing up Boeing 747 performance charts for use at the proposed new Hingurakgoda International Airport. However, some decision-makers believed that the estimated costs, based on Australian labour rates, were too high. Other critics pointed out that the same weather patterns affecting BIA would prevail at Hingurakgoda too. Eventually, that idea was also scrapped.

Then the SLAF decided to move its jet-fighter base to Sigiriya airport which, after extension, could have also accepted big passenger jets diverting from BIA. However, the Department of Archaeology objected to that move on the grounds of noise and vibration produced by jet engines adversely affecting the structure and amenity of Sigiriya Rock.

In response, Sri Lanka’s then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga granted the Director of Archaeology, Dr. Roland Silva, and chairman of the Urban Development Authority, Mr. Gemunu Silva, an eminent civil engineer, the use of a SLAF Bell 412 helicopter for two weeks, to travel to all parts of the island looking for a suitable location for an alternative international airport. The pair identified a potential 250-acre site within the triangle formed by Kekirawa, Dambulla and Habarana, consisting mostly of crown land requiring no major acquisition from resident farmers. A report was submitted to the president, but nothing eventuated from that exercise.

Second Runway at BIA

Meanwhile, many experts declared that the best option was indeed to construct a second runway at BIA. Accordingly, an extensive study was conducted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in conjunction with Mr. Dayantha Athulathmudali, a former deputy director of CAASL. They took into consideration such diverse factors as: the proximity to the Attanagalu Oya; relocating the SLAF base from Katunayake to another site; the effect on the Free Trade Zone (FTZ); and how the many churches and temples in the area may be affected. The primary question was whether the new, second runway, aligned parallel to the existing one (built with Japanese aid), should be situated north or south of it.

Going Down South

But before any decision on the future of expansion at Katunayake was made, it was announced by the then secretary to Ports and Civil Aviation that three potential sites in the Hambantota District were under consideration: Udamaththala, Gonnoruwa and Weerawila. Already, in 2007, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted on behalf of Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd (AASL), on behalf of the Central Environmental Authority (CEA), by the Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau (CECB). The report stated that as there was already an airport at Weerawila, it was the most cost-effective location for the second international airport, and therefore the preferred of all three options examined.

When it was eventually announced that the second international airport would be built at Weerawila, many aviation ‘experts’ wrote to the newspapers claiming that the government had its priorities mixed, and that the best option was, still, to build a second runway at BIA. One writer even said that Weerawila is “one of the best examples of an ill-conceived project and chronic waste of tax-payers’ money.”

Similar sentiments were expressed in 1975, when the Canadian government built a new airport at Mirabel in Montreal to cater to the 1976 Olympics in that city. But after the Olympics, and for a variety of other economic reasons, Montreal-Mirabel Airport gradually fell into disuse over the next 27 years. In Sri Lanka, concerned parties believed that Weerawila would suffer an identical fate.

When farmers discovered that the officially preferred site was Weerawila, and that their paddy lands would have to be acquired, organisations representing them resorted to legal action, forcing the government to revert to its second preference, Udamaththala, 13 km from Weerawila. Accordingly, 800 hectares (almost 2,000 acres) were cleared, and 44,000 hardwood trees chopped down on land that largely comprised elephant habitat. Although it was widely known that this site was in the middle of an elephant corridor, no-one protested – at least not immediately.

Yet the chairman of the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) subsequently said: “Since there was no objection from any stakeholders we gave permission to the Mattala project. I refute the allegations levelled against this institution by the environmentalists. Those allegations are made to mislead the people.”

The Mattala airport project started in 2009, but airline pilots, the ‘end users’, were not consulted. Nor was there any serious aeronautical or environmental research. For example, no wind studies were carried out, contrary to ICAO recommendations that before construction of a new airport commences a wind study must be conducted for at least five years, with readings taken at least eight times daily at frequent intervals. ICAO also stipulates, in Annex 14 to the ICAO Convention, that the potential for turbulence must be studied too. CAASL officers neither knew nor cared to determine the locations relative to each other of the proposed airport, Bundala Bird Sanctuary, and Yala National Park. They even lacked a detailed map of the area, despite the author having donated a 1:50000 map to the CAASL.

In March 2007 the Sri Lanka Aeronautical Society (SLAeS) was formed to primarily serve as a think tank on aviation matters, with all aspects coming under its purview. When the first president of the SLAeS, who was an airline captain not working in Sri Lanka, pointed out the embarrassing truth that Mattala was going to be a bad investment, and that it was SLAeS’s duty to make it known, his warning was not well received by CAASL officials. Instead, because the Mattala airport project had to proceed at all costs, a parallel association was formed to take over some of the functions of the SLAeS with a view to deliberately shutting down the latter body – which soon happened. Sadly no-one, including officers of CAASL, was bold enough to speak up for fear of incurring the ire of political forces driving the establishment in that location of what would be named Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA).

So much so that in 2017, by which time the viability of MRIA was shown to be far below expectations, the aviation minister declared to members of CAASL: “ඔයගොල්ලෝ අපිට කියුව්වේ නැහැ” (“You people never told us”). In other words, claiming not to have been forewarned of what a farce the new, grossly under-utilised airport would turn out to be.

But there were other acts of omission. In fairness to CAASL, in 2007 its management was in a fluid state. The CAASL chairman’s contract hadn’t been renewed, and the director-general had taken leave of absence from CAASL as he had had a difference of opinion with the then chairman of Mihin Lanka, the newly formed government-backed regional airline. Consequently, CAASL officials were all acting in other capacities.

Nowadays at Mattala the air is often extremely turbulent on final approach, and it is a struggle even for pilots of big jets who occasionally fly in there. On some days lighter aircraft are also unable to land due to turbulence. Ironically, today the same farming organisations which took out an interim injunction on development of the Weerawila airport are affected by elephants displaced from the Mattala precinct.

Creating further environmental disruption and damage, trees at the future site of Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium, another grandiose government project built at Sooriyawewa in the Hambantota District, were felled in the name of progress. That stadium has also been rarely used for its intended purpose, and fallen into neglect and deterioration.

According to Nirmala Kannangara writing in the Sunday Leader, the Director of the Environment Conservation Trust, Sajeewa Chamikara, is reported to have said: “All attempts to educate the Aviation Ministry of the consequences that have to be faced in future when plans were drawn to construct an international airport at Mattala were ignored. Since this area is populated with migrant birds throughout the year, we told the government to shift the location to a place with less vulnerability, but their failure to listen to us has now brought several consequences.” Mr. Chamikara’s warnings were supported by many leading professionals who also wrote about the dire consequences to aircraft, passengers and crew in the event of bird strikes.

The author on final approach to MRIA, the airport surrounded by jungle

But building a new airport, suitably located or otherwise, is not the end of the process. The airport authority must continuously maintain it, at great expense. High safety standards must be met in a multitude of areas, not least aircraft inspection, servicing, overhaul and repair.

All components of its infrastructure require constant attention, for example such items as: maintenance of landing visual aids; provision of spare parts; adhering to a lighting maintenance schedule for general and basic maintenance of approach, runway and taxiway lighting systems; aircraft docking systems including their specific light maintenance procedures; cleaning procedures for lights; light intensity measurements; removal of water (condensation); maintaining signs and painted markings. Painting runway centre lines alone requires more than 1,000 gallons of white paint.

Runway and tarmac surfaces need constant maintenance and repair, with attention paid to joints and cracks in concrete and bituminous pavements. ‘Gardening’ activities must be undertaken regularly to keep grass and other unpaved areas neat and free of excess growth. Building maintenance must encompass such aspects as lighting and other electrical equipment, communication facilities, air conditioning systems, automatic doors, baggage conveyor belts, baggage claim units, passenger boarding bridges, people lifts (elevators), people movers (escalators and travelators), fixed fire protection installations. Not least, conducting regular safety meetings. The list goes on.

In view of the above, the question must be asked: did the authorities get their priorities mixed up? Their rationale for MRIA’s creation and existence to earn revenue as an emergency refuge for overflying traffic between two other destinations is no more than a myth. BIA can satisfy the same requirement. Apart from a second runway at BIA, the focus should have been on improving domestic air services, for locals and tourists, by developing existing airports, or creating new facilities, at Jaffna, Batticaloa and Weerawila.

It has to be said, though, that Jaffna has since attained the status of an international airport, as have Ratmalana and Batticaloa, with planning already underway for Hingurakgoda to join Sri Lanka’s multitude of ‘international gateways’, taking the total to six. Yes, count them – six international airports on an island the size of Tasmania, Australia. Overkill? Political grandstanding? Parochialism? Nest-feathering? You be the judge.

At the time of writing, 11 years have elapsed since the MRIA ‘white elephant’ was commissioned, yet it continues to suck up taxpayers’ money better than any leech could. Today’s crop of so-called ‘aviation experts’ are unable to come up with an acceptable solution to turn MRIA into a profitable enterprise. Meanwhile, people in high places with vested interests in and ‘connections’ with the regime that built that wasteful airport in the first place continue to sing its praises while suggesting possible alternatives for using MRIA as an aviation ‘hub’. But that is nothing more than pie in the sky. Or like the emperor’s new clothes in the folktale by Hans Christian Andersen.

So, while MRIA’s runways see more use by trespassing elephants – across whose traditional migratory path the airport violated – than airliners with fare-paying passengers, the question must be asked: what can be done with MRIA? Will the chairman and director-general of CAASL, in conjunction with AASL and environmentalists be able to resolve this expensive problem and face the situation squarely? Or will the nation have to wait even more years for a satisfactory solution than it took for the stewards of Mirabel International Airport, Montreal, Quebec, Canada? “

Capt. Gihan A Fernando

Annexure: A reasonable solution for Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport

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A NOTE From Michael Roberts, June 2026

If I am not mistaken the construction of this airport was a kind of Rajapaksa family project nurturing their ‘hometown’ constituency and linked explicitly with the development of Hambantota port (the latter an aspect that is not addressed in this review).

The review indicates that there were colossal failures in the pre-planning of this ‘asset’. Our reflections today should also encompass the several articles presented within the Thuppahi site on the airport and Hambantota port.

A SECOND NOTE From Michael Roberts

I am beginning to build a bibliography on ths topic, I came across this DIGITAL UPDATE on Mattala …..a NOTE which I trust Capt Fernando will address.

The Mattala Airport handled a total of 140,614 passengers last year, which is the largest passenger movement recorded within a year since the airport’s opening in 2013. During 2025, the airport also successfully handled 703 international flights…. 5 Feb 2026