Sri Lankan Armed Forces vs the Tamil Tigers: The Last Phase

Serge De Silva Ranasinghe, in The Diplomat, 20 May 2010,*** where the title runs thus “Reflections on the Tigers”

A year after the LTTE’s defeat, evidence shows criticism of Sri Lanka’s army is misplaced, says Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe.

Tamil civilians reach safety across Nandhikadal Lagoon —Pix by SL army



A year ago this week, the Sri Lankan government officially declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in one of the most extraordinary counter-insurgency campaigns in recent times.

The endgame of the conflict, particularly from January to May 2009, saw the bloodiest fighting, often with the presence of tens of thousands of civilians that the LTTE desperately used to fend off its inevitable defeat. Since then, new evidence has become public that offers further insights into the final months of Sri Lanka’s secessionist civil war.

For decades, the jungle-laden Mullaitivu District, located in Sri Lanka’s northeast, served as the LTTE’s main stronghold. However, under significant military pressure from the Sri Lankan Army during the final stages of the conflict, the LTTE conducted a fighting retreat towards its last bastion astride the Mullaitivu coastline.

As it did so, the LTTE used all means at its disposal to inflict casualties to delay, halt or even push back the Army’s advance. For example, the LTTE constructed a series of embankments between two and three metres high, also known as earth bunds, which proved to be formidable defensive obstacles. Assault troops also encountered camouflaged LTTE armour plated bunkers.

According to one frontline Army officer from the time: ‘You don’t know where they are, and you can’t even see them until your right on them…The first you know is when you are wounded in the leg. All we can do is to fire towards the sound, throw grenades and send off RPGs [Rocket Propelled Grenades] in the general direction.’

In addition, frontline infantry often confronted elaborately laid LTTE minefields that required field engineers equipped with Bangalore torpedoes to clear pathways. Similarly, the LTTE cleverly utilised booby traps made of discarded rubbish and metal that were tied to hidden explosive caches dispersed over a wide area that when triggered caused multiple and devastating explosions.

Each passing month saw increasingly fierce combat. Reports suggested that the Army absorbed anywhere between 10 and 20 fatalities per daysometimes more—while the Army claims that the LTTE suffered average losses ranging from 25 to 40 combatants per day. Due to high levels of attrition and the need to augment its depleted conventional formations, the LTTE had little choice than to continue to rely heavily on forced recruitment of civilians, a practice that it revived full-scale in late 2007.

To ensure a ready supply of civilians, the LTTE adopted a series of coercive measures such as that reported in one Sri Lankan newspaper which quoted a 14-year-old female child soldier saying the LTTE had warned her that her family would be punished if she didn’t join. Indeed, the Army confirmed that an increasing number of conscripts were seen at the frontline, notably child soldiers. ‘It’s like looking at your own child. Quite large numbers [of the LTTE fighters killed or captured] are under 16,’ one Army Brigadier told the Telegraph. ‘They grab them from their parents and [when] they try to pull them back they [the parents] get shot. These children have dog tags and cyanide capsules.’ Indeed, it was later revealed, according to the independent Sri Lankan daily, The Island, that in the final months of the war the LTTE planned to carry out a massive offensive against the Army with 300 suicide bombers, but was forced to cancel it as many suicide bombers were either killed in action or deserted to government-controlled territory.

LEAVE A COMMENT  …. Three comments recorded early … and NOW in 2023 the web reference is no longer valid.

1.     Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka

May 22, 2010 at 11:11 am

I would prefer to go by a study made by a top professional who is non-Sri Lankan. I refer readers to the Manekshaw paper No. 22, of the Land warfare Studies Centre, Delhi, authored by Gen Ashok Mehta. It pretty much confirms Sergei de Silva Ranasinghe’s essay in your journal. So does last week’s article in The Hindu by Col Hariharan, formerly of Indian military intelligence. None of these non-Sri Lankan military studies bear out tales of large scale, intentional killings of civilians, i.e. atrocities, war crimes etc.

2.     shan … May 21, 2010 at 3:35 pm

Great analysis Sergie, unlike the Tamil diaspora backed reports this gives an in- depth analysis of what really happened.

c    Rajah ……… May 21, 2010 at 11:18 pm

If this is what really happened, why are the Sri-Lankan Government rejecting international calls for an independent inquiry? What are they afraid of? Why should the world believe “Ranasinghe”, a Sinhalese in the payroll of the Sri-Lankan Government, over what the Tamil Diaspora or independent groups say?

If this is what really happened, then let an independent inquiry prove it and that’s that. End of story. It would be lights out for anyone saying otherwise. Instead, analysis by Ranasinghe, Gunaratne, and other Government backed people is not going to prove anything. It becomes a he-said she-said scenario.

       end of article

*** The web reference for this item no longer generates any work. It appears that THE DIPLOMAT found it diplomatic to eliminate its past productions after a spell; but I speculate here.

A NOTE from The Editor, Thuppahi, 17 March 2023

“Rajah” (or is it Shan?) attempts a standard line of attack/dismissal in rubbishing De Silva-Ranasinghe’s analysis by (a) marking him as a government stooge and (b) pressing for an “independent tribunal.”

First: we know only too well that the UN Secretariat guided by Ban ki-Moon and Navy Pillai proved to be highly-biased; while the UNHRC outfit at Geneva headed by Eileen Donahue & Sandra Beidas was anything but impartial.

Readers should have a chat with Tamara Kunanayakam  and hear the tale about a threat viz. “We shall get you!” spat at her during a telephone call by Donahue circa 2012.

Second:  The fact is that Serge De Silva-Ranasinghe has been mostly educated in Australia and has been one of the “security analysts” employed by the “WA Defence Review Team” at Perth in Australia since about 2008 (see ……………….. & ……………………..

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One response to “Sri Lankan Armed Forces vs the Tamil Tigers: The Last Phase

  1. Pingback: De Silva-Ranasinghe’s In-Depth Studies of the LTTE’s Downfall During Eelam War IV . A Bibliography | Thuppahi's Blog

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