Forging An Inclusive Sri Lankaness in Today’s World

The frenzied online actions of thousands of Sri Lankans responding to the Canadian actress, Maitreyi Ramakrishnan, calling herself an Eelam Tamil and opting not to identify herself with Sri Lanka has gone viral.  Many of these were ‘Sinhalas’ from the country and the diaspora. An equal number of people spoke in support of the actress too, most being diasporic and local Tamils. Much of the latter was driven by a sense of online-Eelam nationalism. The liberal-woke types from Lanka claimed the Canadian actress as our own despite Ramakrishnan having made it very clear she does not want to be identified as such.  The first two of these expressions are clear examples of ways in which nationalism should not manifest, usually as a divisive and exclusionary force. The liberal third expression is simply silly, irrelevant and sad. This said, I have never considered nationalism as useless or dangerous if it can be intelligently and inclusively fashioned to serve the nation. This is very different from my friends in the Sri Lankan Left, who have generally rejected all forms of nationalism.

However, one must be mindful that across the globe nationalism has long walked a dangerous tightrope. Too often, its supporters in different countries have defined the nation through an exclusionary lens, drawing narrow circles around who ‘truly’ belongs and pushing minority communities to the periphery. Two very dangerous ongoing manifestations are epitomised by the virulent US and Israeli nationalisms espoused by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. Consequences of their toxic rhetoric have gone beyond their national borders to impact the entire world.  In Sri Lanka, this global malaise has found a localised anchoring as exemplified by the online explosion of competing ethnic nationalisms referred to at the beginning of this essay.

For decades, dominant political narratives have cast nationalism mostly in majoritarian and ethno-cultural and religious terms, overtly or subtly privileging the Sinhala identity. In doing so, this version has mostly alienated Tamil, Muslim, Burgher, and other communities, transforming a concept that should have ideally unified the people of the nation into a wedge that drives them apart. These other communities also have on their own come up with similarly competitive, exclusionary and at times, virulent forms of ethnoreligious natalisms.

But this is not how Sri Lankan nationalism emerged, at least among the elites, in the early years prior to independence. It was far more inclusive and inclusionary than we can fathom today. Compounding the present exclusionary trend is a more cynical phenomenon. That is the weaponization of identity by woefully unethical political interests. In the hands of many political parties and at present, among the fractured and irrelevant political opposition, nationalism in Sri Lanka has been reduced to crude, emotional rhetoric. Or to put it more clearly, it has been turned into a tool of convenience hauled out during election cycles or in times of existential political crisis to secure votes and support through divisive and chauvinistic mobilization. This phenomenon is clearly visible among Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim-dominated political parties.

This brand of nationalism is both offensive and counterproductive, even though many nationalisms in the world today work precisely like this.  Such a negative, virulent and exclusionary nationalism only offers hollow slogans while failing to address the fundamental socio-economic realities and existential crises reaching across international borders that ordinary citizens must face regardless of whether they speak Sinhala or Tamil. It thrives on stoking fear rather than building state capacity or national pride.

To break this cycle, Sri Lanka must self-consciously move toward an inclusive civic nationalism. In my mind, this reimagined identity must necessarily encompass all Sri Lankans across ethnic, linguistic, and religious boundaries. This is the kind of nationalism that did exist among the elites prior to independence and also reemerged decisively during the public protests of the aragalaya.  But I am unsure of its continuity, although it is clear the present government has not offered any ammunition to build a divisive and exclusionary nationalism within the country as in the past. Such inclusive civic nationalism however, does not manifest in the government’s dealings with other nations where the more dominant streak is an unfathomable sense of servility.

Crucially, this new civic nationalism must operate purely on behalf of the sovereign state and its national interest, refusing to use ethnicity or religion as filters for patriotism.  It should also be a driver for our national interest when dealing with other countries –– big or small. When a citizen contributes to the economy, pays taxes, or defends the rule of law, their right to the nation is absolute. True nationalism respects diversity not as a concession, but as the very bedrock of the nation’s strength.

An inclusive nationalism, however, is not merely a domestic moral imperative; it is a geopolitical necessity as well. In an era where small nations are increasingly caught in the crosshairs of great power competition, Sri Lanka cannot afford to be internally fractured.

We have seen ample evidence of how external pressures can sideline our interests — whether through lopsided economic leverage, geopolitical arm-twisting, or diplomatic overreach by regional and global powers like India and China. Particularly this international dimension of nationalism has not seriously been discussed in Sri Lanka and it is hardly an integral part in our negotiations with other nations.

There has been continuous diplomatic pressure and policy lobbying, driven by long-term Indian security and political interests, to construct a physical road and rail link along with power and energy connections between India and Sri Lanka. While Indian proponents and their many Sri Lankan cohorts pitch this purely through an economic lens of trade and tourism, many Sri Lankans view it with deep apprehension. But this apprehension is hardly articulated in any sensible way in any sensible forum including in national politics. It is almost a whisper, albeit a widespread one. Beyond environmental vulnerabilities in the fragile Palk Strait ecosystem, there is a legitimate fear that an open land corridor would strip away Sri Lanka’s natural island strategic defence as well as its identity itself. It risks opening up the country to asymmetric socio-political pressures more than it endures at present, potential demographic and migration imbalances, and tighter economic subjugation by its massive neighbor, effectively transforming Sri Lanka into an easily accessible periphery of the Indian mainland. Besides, a physical link is not an absolute necessity for connectivity.

The Chinese situation is no different. Over the past two decades, aggressive infrastructure financing by Chinese state-owned banks have led Sri Lanka into high-cost commercial debt, culminating in the 2022 economic collapse and the infamous 99-year lease of the Hambantota Port to a Chinese joint venture. This highlights how a weak, fragmented state can be reduced to the role of a pawn in a ‘debt-trap’ or broader Indo-Pacific great power rivalry. When national leaders prioritise short-term political survival or personal patronage networks and wealth accumulation over national interest, critical sovereign assets are compromised, turning parts of Sri Lankan territory into strategic flashpoints for foreign powers. This has already happened in Sri Lanka.

An inclusive Sri Lankan nationalism ensures that decisions on sovereignty and borders as well as the value of national economic assets are evaluated from the standpoint of all citizens and only in the national interest –– not forced through by a locally powerful government with a compliant international relations outlook susceptible to external lobbying. A unified nation can objectively weigh economic connectivity against strategic vulnerability without internal or regional factions weaponizing the issue for sectarian advantage.

In my mind, an inclusive, civic nationalism establishes a firm, non-negotiable doctrine: no foreign power, whether Eastern or Western, regional or global, is permitted to compromise Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity or economic sovereignty. It ensures the country’s national interest and long-term survival are carefully aligned to the economic independence of the nation, ensuring that future governments maintain transparency, resist predatory lending, and treat national assets as sacred public trusts rather than bargaining chips. This does not mean the closure of opportunities for overseas investments. Rather, it means those investments would be based on transparency, on equal grounds and with equal benefits based on similar rules and conditions as those operational in the very countries we deal with.

When a nation is internally divided along ethnic and religious lines or is submissive in the way it deals with the world, it is inherently weak, vulnerable to external manipulation, and ill-equipped to negotiate fiercely.

A unified, inclusive Sri Lanka, backed by a nationalism rooted in collective strength and an inclusive sense of national pride rather than narrow exclusion, can stand its ground. Only then can we speak with one voice to defend our sovereignty, protect our economic assets, and chart an independent course in the Indian Ocean and the world.