A Muslim Militia in the East of Sri Lanka Sponsored by the State

Rajan Hoole, being Chapter 3 of his book “Sri Lanka”s Easter Tragedy: When the Deep State Gets Out of Its Depth”

1. A State-sponsored Muslim Militia in the East

Mohamed Zahran Cassim, whose fate made headlines in Wahabi terror, was born in Kattankudy in 1986. In understanding his rise and death in a suicide blast of Easter, 21^st April 2019, it is useful to keep in mind Velupillai Prabhakaran and how his terror machine subdued an entire people. Zahran’s zeal and ire were initially directed towards subduing the Sufi population of Kattankudy. We shall see that the patronage and protection afforded to him by a section of the Sri Lankan security establishment, changed course because of unexpected mishaps after he led an attack on Sufis on 10^th March 2017. Despite efforts by his handlers, an independent magistrate issued an arrest warrant for him, making him a wanted person. Forced to leave Kattankudy, he was manoeuvred, as circumstances suggest, into becoming an instrument of suicide terror.

Zahran’s rise can be traced back to the State’s new approach post July 1983. One of the first steps was the setting up of the Joint Special Services Operations (JOSSOP) in early October 1983 involving the Service Chiefs and a civil servant D.J. Bandaragoda who was then Deputy Chairman of the Mahaweli Authority. One of its chief objectives was to advance Sinhalese settlement in the North and East as a counter to the Tamil nationalist challenge. The question is discussed at some depth in Arrogance of Power, Ch. 19. It was an enterprise that spurred the growth of the LTTE with a reputation for ruthlessness that paralleled the State’s.

It was part and parcel of this approach to exacerbate existing social cleavages between Tamils and Muslims of the East, who spoke the same language, as a wedge against Tamil Nationalism.

Using the killing of three Muslims by trigger happy Tamil militants in the Mannar District, on 12^th April 1985, the newly deployed Special Task Force (which was trained by the British firm Keeny Meeny Services using ex-SAS men), led Muslim thugs of Minister M.H. Mohamed from Colombo to attack the Tamil village of Karaitivu, south of Kalmunai, killing 11 civilians. Three days later, on 15^th April 1985 after prayers, a cry went over the loudspeaker in a  Mosque in Kattankudy south of Batticaloa that Tamils from Manjantoduwa were coming to attack them. Soon afterwards a police armoured car, led by an officer identified as Piyasena from the Special Investigations Unit, led a mob of Muslims armed with improvised weapons to attack the Tamil village of Navatkudah to the north, killing four civilians.

These were crude and clumsy attempts to foment divisions between the Tamils and Muslims. In a speech made at the opening of the Muslim Cultural Centre in Mutur on 12^th April, A.L.A. Majeed, former MP for Mutur, said (Veerakesari, 16.4.85): “The Tamils and Muslims have been living peacefully for hundreds of years. I wish to bring to your notice that certain sin- ister forces and self-interested parties are trying to bring about a violent clash between Tamils and Muslims”. He pointed a finger at certain ‘fake politicians’ and called upon the Muslims to be vigilant. The warning was given at the very beginning of the violence, suggesting that he had got word of what was coming.

The twin policies set out became determinants of the Deep State, by which we mean a body of organised interests comprising dominant sections of the political establishment and the security apparatus, ready and willing to pursue partisan goals in contempt of the law. One of its earliest actions was to use the Mahaweli Authority backed by military force to settle poor hapless Sinhalese civilians in the North (UTHR Special Report No.5 of 1993 and Arrogance of Power Ch.19). The other was to drive a wedge between Tamils and Muslims in the East. After the LTTE was driven out of the East in 2007, the Government found that the easy way to divide Tamils and Muslims was to promote Wahabi hegemony over the Muslim population, to sunder their local roots that developed over many centuries and make them an insular, foreign people.

When Karuna’s Eastern Faction split from the LTTE in April 2004, the Government stood aside and allowed the LTTE to smash it, killing several of the Faction’s child conscripts whom it was the Government’s duty to protect. But it later used fugitive Karuna group members as killers and assassins. When the final phase of the war began in 2006, the Army intelligence used Auto-Kaleel, a former member of the LTTE to recruit scores of Muslims, who in time came to be known as Jihad, to be trained by Mangalan Master of the Karuna group to assist the Army in ‘liberating the East’. One reason why the security forces turned a blind eye to abuses against the civilian population by the armed factions is that much of the risky frontline fighting in the East had been done by the Karuna group and the Muslim recruits, both of whom worked closely together. The latter received training from the Karuna group in their common fight against the LTTE and fought alongside Karuna cadres in Vaharai for example. When Mutur was under siege in 2006, the Karuna group, and the Muslims it trained, took on difficult roles in the fighting. This is similar to the use made by the US of Jihadis who later made up the Al Qaida to evict the Russians from Afghanistan.

Another reason why the Government ignored abuses by the Karuna Group and the Muslim recruits was that the Defence Ministry found it convenient to use them for their dirty work, such as extra-judicial killings while reducing the exposure of the Government to infamy. One incident in Valaichenai/Oddamavady gives an idea of how the Sinhalese State regarded its assorted Tamil and Muslim mercenaries.

On 12^th November 2007, Izzadeen Sabras, Aboobucker Illyas and Mohamed Aliyar Rizwan of the Civil Defence Force (as Home Guards were renamed in February 2006), were on duty at midnight along Boundary Road, Oddamavady, accompanied by civilians Abubucker Naufer and Illyas Abdul Cader,  when all five were abducted by men who came in a white van. Nothing was heard for three months. The families learnt on the basis of intelligence leaks that Army Intelligence was involved in the abductions. The father of one of the disappeared admitted to a human rights group, knowledge of his son having been used in extra-judicial tasks. This is an example of the expendability of groups used by the State and had nowhere to go. Life had become so brutalised that the people concerned lost the ability to question such routine betrayal.

In 2007, after the LTTE withdrew from the East, the Muslim fighters moved away from the Karuna group and Kaleel and his followers took on a veneer of heightened religious zeal and came to be known as the Jihad. Kaleel was named by locals as the leader of the gang responsible for the ritual murder of the 15-year-old girl Hidaya who was abused by a number of people in whose care she was (UTHR(J), Special Report No.26, August 2007, and Special Report No.29, February 2008). The Magistrate who conducted the inquest into Hidaya’s murder ordered the Police to arrest the suspects of whom Auto Kaleel was one. The situation was still not normal and the Police did not report back making any arrests.

In time the armed factions, the Karuna group and the Muslims trained by it quarrelled and the handlers from the State placed them in different areas under different patrons. For example the Karuna group split into the Karuna and Pillayan groups. The former was given an area south of Araiampathy reaching up to Pottuvil and remained patronised by the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) intent on curbing the Muslims in Amparai District, where they were most numerous. The JHU’s interests were represented by Defence Advisor, former DIG H.M.G.B. Kotakadeniya.

 Kaleel according to our sources went over to the intelligence outfit aligned to Pillayan, which was patronised by the Patriotic National Movement (PNM), JHU’s rival in the extremist camp. Leaders of the PNM included former JVP ideologue Wimal Weerawansa, Gunadasa Amarasekera and Nalin de Silva. The latter outfit, we learn, had a total of about 35 Muslim agents in Valaichenai, Eravur and Kattankudy. Both the JHU and PNM operated under Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (UTHR(J) Special Report 29).

This loose atmosphere of armed cadres attached to various intelligence outfits was used for political assassinations and also to curb the influence of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Hayath Mohamed Latif (50), known as Colonel, was a popular public spirited figure in Valaichenai, who supported the SLMC. After initial sympathy for armed Muslim youths who took up arms in 2006, he became critical of them, particularly of Kaleel. On 11^th August 2007, he was shot dead in the premises of Baduriya Mosque, where he daily spent an hour in the early hours of the morning.

The rise of Wahabism amongst those already trained in the use of arms as home guards from 1990 and trained militarily by the Karuna group after the 2004 LTTE split, served to heighten and militarize the violence against Sufis in the East, particularly Kattankudy South. While Sri Lanka earned infamy for communal violence against Tamils and continues to pay for it, the bouts of communal violence which the Wahabis inflicted on Sufis in Kattankudy since 2004, has been played down because it supports the purpose of the State.

The Sufi order of Thareekathul Mufliheen was founded by Sheihul Mufliheen M.S.M. Abdullah, known as Pailvan in the late 1980s. He taught that while God is ineffable, each human being is free to choose a path of faith. Having in 1996, won a six year court battle against the council of Islamic scholars, the All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulama (ACJU) in Colombo, the Sufi order had to survive constant persecution and attacks by the Wahabis who were strengthened by donations from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and by the presence of persons who had been employed there as migrant workers. On 5^th May 1998 the local Sufi leader Farook Moulavi was shot and killed by Wahabi assassins. No arrests were made.

The worst attack was on October 31, 2004, at 12:30 P.M. when 500 Wahhabis organized under the title “Jihad” again set the Meditation Centre ablaze, destroying its library, along with homes and businesses owned by Sufis (Schwartz). TamilNet (3 Nov.2004) reported ‘More than two hundred Muslim families that belong to the Sufi sect led by the cleric Abdur Rauf Mowlavi sought refuge in Araiyampathy, a Tamil village next to Kattankudy on Tuesday night, fearing  violent attacks by armed orthodox Islamic groups.’ The refugees alleged conversion to Wahabism at gunpoint.

Persons contacted by us said that the refugees were fed by the Army from a nearby camp and the Karuna Group. It took two weeks for the local MP Hisbullah to meet them and make arrangements for them to go back.

The worst attacks came in 2006 when the LTTE was on the retreat from the East and militant Wahabism had been strengthened by military training from the Karuna group. Reports by the Press and Police distracted attention from their true nature by describing them as Sufi-Wahabi clashes. It was invariably a case of Wahabi toughs moving into the Sufi area. Take the following report by Asif Fuard in the Sunday Times of 8^th October 2006 titled Sufi, Wahabi clashes rock Kattankudy:

“The problems began last Saturday, when a group of women who had broken fast were on their way to a Sufi mosque for congregational prayers. When they arrived at the mosque they had been accosted by a group of young men belonging to the Wahabis who had started mocking them. One of the women had retorted and the ensuing heated argument had ended with the woman being manhandled. Some Sufi followers who witnessed this scene had in turn attacked the Wahabi youth.”

The same report said that Wahabi scholars of the Jamayathul Ulema who represent the Kattankudy Grand Mosque put forward 10 conditions, which included the Sufis closing down their newspaper and radio broadcasts. The Sufis refused citing Article 10 of the Constitution which entitles every person to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to adopt a religion or belief of one’s own choice. On 7^th November 2006 Wahabi militants of the Thowheed group fired 35 rounds to kill the Sufi cleric Rauf Moulavi, who survived (Chris Kamalendran & Asif Fuard, Sunday Times, 16^th Aug. 2009).

When Pailvan (69) passed away on 6^th December 2006 and was buried Tharikathul Mufliheen Mosque burial grounds, the grave was desecrated by the Wahabis resulting in rioting in Kattankudy. The police opened fire killing three rioters. The houses of 117 Sufis were levelled by fire. Many were threatened and fled the district. Two were injured, and one lost an arm (Stephen Schwartz and Irfan Al-Alawi, 2012).

Until the war and militarisation there was no indication of state agencies taking the side of Wahabis against the Sufis. Vigilantism against Sufis was inspired by positions taken by the local Jamayathul Ulema. The role of the state agencies began when Muslim youths who received military training in the fight against the LTTE and were patronised by intelligence agencies went back to Kattankudy and were then recruited into a more stringent Wahhabi movement. This could be seen in the names by which several Wahabi militants were known: Police Faiz, Army Mohideen, Army Niyas etc.

With a younger generation of fiery Wahabi preachers who appealed to these militarily trained youth, who were originally patronised by state intelligence agencies and the PNM, a bridge was set in place between intelligence handlers and the young preachers.

It may be recalled that it was the PNM that in 2006 petitioned the Supreme Court for the demerger of the North-East Province, merged under the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. The obverse of this project was to build a wall that would render the Tamils and Muslims in the East irreconcilable. As observed, Wahabism which aimed at purifying and severing “inauthentic” local practices of Muslims served this purpose well.

It was also in 2006 with Gotabhaya Rajapaksa as Defence Secretary that vigilantism by state operatives peaked. The exhibition killing of the five students in Trincomalee on 2^nd January 2006 was carried out by an STF unit sent by Defence Advisor Kotakadeniya. Evidence further suggests that SSP Kapila Jayasekere who handled the killing of the five students, was present in Mutur when a combined unit of police, home guards and Special Forces killed the 17 aid workers in Mutur on 4^th August 2006. The killing of MP Raviraj in Colombo involved the intelligence services acting in concert with extremist Buddhist elements and Tamil paramilitary groups (UTHR(J) SpR 29). This culture of impunity was absorbed by Muslim recruits who served with the government forces and joined the Jihadi groups.

The consolidation of armed Wahabism went hand in hand with state-vigilantism in the East, whose beginnings in 1985 had the dual purpose of subduing Tamil Nationalism and advancing Sinhalisation of the East. At the end of the war in May 2009, the Sunday Times report above (Kamalendran, Fuard, 2006) quoted the Police as saying that there was an armed Islamic movement funded by West Asian countries. But post war, a highly armed Muslim group was no longer needed to isolate the Tamils. What politicians needed was a show of militant backing.

The Tamil example gives us a precedent. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) dominated Tamil politics in the 1970s with rhetorical parliamentary politics founded on identity that with words and gestures insinuates militant backing. The saying carried both at home and among the diaspora that the TULF leader Amirthalingam had a programme and had the militant youth working with him to that end, became part of his appeal. But the 1977 communal violence tilted politics decisively in favour of the militants. The supposed puppets supplanted the puppeteers. Muslim parliamentary politicians understood this danger. Whence M.L.A.M. Hisbullah told the Parliamentary Select Committee (Sunday Times 14 Jun.2019), “I am the happiest to know that [Zahran] has died as I can win the next election easily without any trouble from his group.” Nevertheless, the local judiciary and police were confident that Hisbullah played a godfather role with Islamic militants at least to the extent of protecting them from the arm of the law.

THIS ITEM is the third chapter in a book published in 2019 by Ravaya …. ISBN 978-955-7560-61-8

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My Aloysian mate, KK De Silva, used his technical skills to render the illustrative photographs presentable. Certa Viriliter.

ADDENDUM: I have refrained from my usual policy of imposing highlights to mark central claims or pieces of evidence. The Easter Attacks carried out by Muslim extremists originating in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka generated a large corpus of literature ………… inclusive of SL Muslim reporters and/or authors. Since Rajan has not provided a bibliography, we are not able to assess the range of his background reading & investigations.

However, take note of some of the coverage that was provided in TPS within the year itself.

ABC 2019 “Sri Lanka: Hoping for Harmony,” 23 June 2019, ……………………….. https://www.abc.net.au/religion/watch/compass/sri-lanka—hoping-for-harmony/11205798

Ameer Ali, ACL  2009a “The Transformation of Muslim Politics in Sri Lanka and the Growth of Wahhabism from the 1980s,” 5 May 2009, https://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2019/05/05/the-transformation-of-muslim-politics-in-sri-lanka-and-the-growth-of-wahhabism-from-the-1980s/

Ameer Ali, ACL 2019b “How Extremisms have fed off Each Other in Sri Lanka, 1950s-to-2019 … and still proceeding,”  6 May 2019, https://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2019/05/06/how-extremisms-have-fed-off-each-other-in-sri-lanka-1950s-to-2019-and-still-proceeding/

Jayasuriya, Wilfrid 2019 “The Force of the Moors: Reflections Historical and Ethnographic,” 25 June 2019, ……………………………………………………. https://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2019/06/25/the-force-of-the-moors-reflections-historical-and-ethnographic/

Thuppahi Item:  2019 “The Death Toll in Sri Lanka: Ethnicity,”  4 May 2019, https://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2019/05/04/the-death-toll-in-sri-lanka-ethnicity/

ALSO

Roberts, Michael: 2019  “”The Clash of Civilisations and Hate at the Heart of 21/4 in Sri Lanka,”14 May 2019, ………. https://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2019/05/14/the-clash-of-civilisations-and-hate-at-the-heart-of-21-4-in-sri-lanka/#more-35621

MAM Shukri: 1986  Muslims of Sri Lanka, Beruwela, 1986