Gp Capt Kumar Kirinde, [SLAF retd] as compiler presenting US special forces operation for the rescue of hostages at the US Embassy in Iran in 1980 that ended in a failure …. Sources:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eagle_Claw and Google Images
Introduction: Operation Eagle Claw was a failed operation (carried on 24 April 1980) by the United States Armed Forces ordered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter to attempt the rescue of 52 embassy staff held captive at the Embassy of the United States, Tehran.
The operation, one of Delta Force’s* first, encountered many obstacles and failures and was subsequently aborted. Eight helicopters were sent to the first staging area called Desert One, but only five arrived in operational condition. One had encountered hydraulic problems, another was caught in a sand storm, and the third showed signs of a cracked rotor blade. During the operational planning, it was decided that the mission would be aborted if fewer than six helicopters remained operational upon arrival at the Desert One site, despite only four being absolutely necessary. In a move that is still discussed in military circles, the field commanders advised President Carter to abort the mission, which he did.
As the U.S. forces prepared to withdraw from Desert One, one of the remaining helicopters crashed into a transport aircraft that contained both servicemen and jet fuel. The resulting fire destroyed both aircraft and killed eight servicemen.
USASOC’s shoulder sleeve insignia worn by Delta operators, depicting the historical Fairbairn–Sykes fighting knife inside the outline of an arrowhead
* The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment–Delta (1st SFOD-D) created in 1977 is referred to as Delta Force, Combat Applications Group (CAG), Army Compartmented Elements (ACE), the Fort Bragg SMU, or within Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Task Force Green. It is a special operations force of the United States Army, under operational control of JSOC. The unit’s missions primarily involve counterterrorism, hostage rescue, direct action, and special reconnaissance, often against high-value targets.
Background
On 4 November 1979, fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were taken hostage in the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, by a group of Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line, avid supporters of the Iranian Revolution. American President Jimmy Carter called the hostage-taking an act of “blackmail” and the hostages “victims of terrorism and anarchy.” but in Iran it was widely seen as an act against the U.S. and its influence in Iran, including its perceived attempts to undermine the Iranian Revolution and its longstanding support of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was overthrown in 1979.
The crisis had reached a climax after diplomatic negotiations failed to secure the release of the hostages. Facing elections and with little to show from negotiations, the Carter government ordered the State Department to sever diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April 1980. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski pushed for a military solution to the crisis and on 11 April President Carter said it was “time for us to bring our hostages home”. On the same day during the Security Council meeting Carter confirmed that he had authorised a military mission to rescue the hostages. The rescue mission was code named Operation Eagle Claw.
Planning and preparation
Army Major General James B. Vaught was appointed as Joint Task Force commander and was to be forward-based at Wadi Kena in Egypt, reporting directly to the President. In turn, he had two field commanders: U.S. Army Colonel Charlie Beckwith as ground forces field commander and USAF Colonel James H. Kyle as the field commander for aviation.
James B. Vaught – Joint Task Force commander
Charlie Beckwith – ground forces field commander (L) and 
James H. Kyle – field commander for aviation
The ambitious plan was to be based on the use of elements from four branches of the U.S. military: Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. The concept was based on an operation whereby helicopters and C-130 aircraft, following different routes, would rendezvous on a salt flat (code-named Desert One*) 200 miles (320 km) southeast of Tehran. Here the helicopters would refuel from the C-130s and pick up the combat troops who had flown in on the C-130 transports. The helicopters would then transport the troops to a mountain location (Desert Two**) closer to Tehran from which the actual rescue raid would be launched into the city the following night. The operation was further to be supported by an in-country CIA team***. On completion of the raid, hostages were to be shepherded to a captured Tehran airport from which they were to be flown to Egypt.
* Desert One was in the South Khorasan Province, in the Dasht-e Lut desert near Tabas
** Desert Two was located 50 miles (80 km) short of Tehran
*** The Tehran CIA Special Activities Division in-country paramilitary team, led by retired a U.S. Army Special Forces officer had two assignments: to obtain information about the hostages and the embassy grounds and to transport the rescue team from Desert Two to the embassy grounds in pre-staged vehicles.
Planned and actual routes for Operation Eagle Claw
Assault teams
The ground forces consisted of 93 Delta soldiers to assault the embassy and a 13-man special forces assault team from Detachment “A” Berlin Brigade to assault the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where three further hostages were being held. A third group of 12 Rangers were to act as the roadblock team at the Desert One landing area. Rangers were also tasked with taking and holding the Manzariyeh Air Base near Tehran to provide the springboard for escape from Iran. In addition, the CIA had prepared an in-country team of 15 Iranian and American Persian-speakers, most of whom would act as truck drivers.
Ingress
The complex plan required that on the first night, three USAF EC-130E Commando Solos carrying the logistical supplies and three MC-130E Combat Talons carrying Delta Force and Ranger troops (132 assault and security troops in total) would depart the island of Masirah, off the coast of Oman for Desert One, a flight of over 1,000 miles (1600 km). They would be refuelled by Air Force KC-135 tankers en route. Desert One would be secured by a protection force and once secured, a refueling area would be established for the helicopters with approximately 6,000 US gallons (22,700 L) of jet fuel being made available from collapsible fuel bladders carried in the C-130s.
EC-130E Commando Solo (L) and MC-130E Combat Talon
KC-135 Tanker
Eight United States Navy (USN) RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters were positioned aboard the carrier USS Nimitz, 60 miles off the coast of Iran. The helicopters would fly 600 miles (970 km) to Desert One, refuel, load up the Delta Force and part of the Ranger teams, and then fly 260 miles (420 km) further to Desert Two. Because it would be close to morning, the helicopters and ground forces would hide during the day at Desert Two. The rescue operation would take place the second night.
Repainted Bluebeard RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters in sand camouflage and without markings aboard USS Nimitz
Rescue raid
First, CIA agents who were already inside Iran would bring trucks they had sourced to Desert Two. Together, the CIA officers and ground forces would then drive from Desert Two into Tehran. This assault team would assault the embassy and Foreign Affairs building, eliminate the guards, and rescue the hostages, with air support from Air Force AC-130 gunships flying from Desert One. The hostages and rescue team would then rendezvous with the helicopters which had flown from Desert Two to the nearby Amjadieh Stadium where the rescue teams and the freed hostages would board the helicopters.
AC-130 Gunship
Egress
In parallel to the rescue, an Army Ranger company would capture the abandoned Manzariyeh Air Base about 60 miles southwest of Tehran, to allow two C-141 Starlifters flying from Saudi Arabia to arrive. With the Rangers holding the airport, the helicopters would bring everyone from the stadium to the Manzariyeh airbase, where the C-141s would fly everyone back to an airbase in Egypt. The eight helicopters would be destroyed before departure.
C-141 Starlifter
Protection and support
Protection for the operation was to be provided by Carrier Air Wing Eight (CVW-8) operating from USS Nimitz and CVW-14 operating from USS Coral Sea. For this operation, the aircraft bore special invasion stripe identification on their right wings. This was necessary to distinguish support aircraft from Iranian F-14 and F-4 aircraft purchased by Iran from the US in the time of the Shah. CVW-14 Marine F-4Ns were marked with a red or yellow stripe enclosed by two black stripes while CVW-14 attack aircraft (A-7s and A-6s) had an orange stripe enclosed by two black stripes.
F-14 Tomcat
F-4 Phantom
A-7 Corsair aboard Coral Sea with special identification stripes added specifically for Operation Eagle Claw
A-6 Intruder
Launch and abort of the mission
Only the delivery of the soldiers, equipment and fuel by the C-130 aircraft went according to plan. MC-130 Dragon 1 landed at Desert One at 22:47 local time. The landing was made under blacked-out conditions using the improvised infrared landing light system installed by Carney on the airstrip, visible only through night vision goggles. The heavily loaded Dragon 1 required four passes to determine that there were no obstructions on the airstrip and to align with the runway. Dragon 1 off-loaded the road-watch teams in Jeeps and a USAF Combat Control Team (CCT) to establish a parallel landing zone north of the dirt road and to set out TACAN beacons to guide in the helicopters.
Soon after the first crews landed and began securing Desert One, a civilian Iranian bus with a driver and 43 passengers was stopped while traveling on the road, which now served as the runway for the aircraft. The bus was forced to halt by the Rangers and the passengers were detained. Minutes after the bus had been stopped, the Rangers in the road-watch team observed a fuel tanker truck, ignoring their orders to halt, bearing down on them. The truck, apparently smuggling fuel, was blown up by the Army Ranger roadblock team using a shoulder-fired rocket as it tried to escape the site. The truck’s passenger was killed, but the driver managed to escape in an accompanying pickup truck. As the tanker truck was thought to be engaged in clandestine smuggling, the driver was not considered to pose a security threat to the mission. However, the resulting fire illuminated the nighttime landscape for many miles around, and actually provided a visual guide to Desert One for the disoriented incoming helicopters.
Two hours into the flight, (Helicopter) RH-53D Bluebeard 6 made an emergency landing in the desert when a sensor indicated a cracked rotor blade. Its crew was picked up by Bluebeard 8 helicopter and the aircraft was abandoned in the desert. The remaining helicopters ran into an unexpected weather phenomenon known as a haboob (an enormous, nearly opaque cloud of fine dust).
Example of a haboob
Bluebeard 5 helicopter flew into the haboob, but abandoned the mission andeturned to the Nimitz when electrical problems disabled flight instruments and flying without visual references proved impossible. The remaining six helicopters reached Desert One, 50 to 90 minutes behind schedule. Bluebeard 2 helicopter arrived last at Desert One at 01:00 with a malfunctioning secondary hydraulic system, leaving only one hydraulic system to control the aircraft.
With only five fully serviceable helicopters now remaining to transport the men and equipment to Desert Two (minimum of six aircraft was the planned mission’s abort threshold), the various commanders reached a stalemate. Senior helicopter pilot Seiffert refused to use unsafe Bluebeard 2 on the mission, while Beckwith (field commander for ground forces) refused to consider reducing his trained rescue team’s size. Kyle (the field aviation commander), therefore, recommended to Vaught that the mission be aborted. The recommendation was passed on by satellite radio up to the President. After two and a half hours on the ground, the presidential abort confirmation was received.
Challenges faced after the decision to abort mission
Collision and fire
Fuel consumption calculations showed that the extra 90 minutes idling on the ground waiting for the abort confirmation order had made fuel critical for one of the EC-130s. When it became clear that only six helicopters would arrive at Desert One, Kyle had authorized the EC-130s to transfer 1,000 US gallons (3,800 L) from the bladders to their own main fuel tanks, but EC-130 Republic 4 had already expended all of its bladder fuel refueling three of the helicopters and had none to transfer. To make it to the air tanker refueling track without running out of fuel, it had to leave immediately and was already loaded with part of the Delta team. In addition, RH-53D Bluebeard 4 needed additional fuel, requiring it to be moved to the opposite side of the road.
To accomplish both actions, Bluebeard 3 had to be moved from directly behind the EC-130. The aircraft could not be moved by ground taxi and had to be moved by hover taxi (flying a short distance at low speed and altitude). A Combat Controller attempted to direct the maneuvre from in front of the aircraft but was blasted by desert sand churned up by the rotor. The Controller attempted to back away, which led Bluebeard 3’s pilot to mistakenly perceive that his craft was drifting backward (engulfed in a dust cloud, the pilot only had the Controller as a point of reference) and thus attempted to “correct” this situation by applying forward stick to maintain the same distance from the rearward moving marshaller. The RH-53D struck the EC-130’s vertical stabilizer with its main rotor and crashed into the EC-130’s wing root.
In the ensuing explosion and fire, eight servicemen died: five of the fourteen USAF aircrew in the EC-130, and three of the five USMC aircrew in the RH-53D, with only the helicopter’s pilot and co-pilot (both badly burned) surviving. After the crash, it was decided to abandon the helicopters and during the frantic evacuation to the EC-130s by the helicopter crews, unsuccessful attempts were made to retrieve their classified mission documents and destroy the aircraft.
The helicopter crews boarded the EC-130s. Five RH-53D aircraft were left behind at Desert One mostly intact, some damaged by shrapnel. They could not be destroyed, because they were loaded with ammunition and any fire or explosion would have endangered the C-130s.
The EC-130s carried the remaining forces back to the intermediate airfield at Masirah Island, where two C-141 medical evacuation aircraft from the staging base at Wadi Abu Shihat, Egypt picked up the injured personnel, helicopter crews, Rangers and Delta Force members, and returned to Wadi Kena. The injured were then transported to Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center in Germany. The following day, after learning about the events at Desert One from the local Iranian news, the Tehran CIA team quietly left Iran, with the Iranians unaware of their presence.
Aftermath
The White House announced the failed rescue operation at 01:00 a.m. the following day (25 April 1980). Iranian Army investigators found nine bodies (eight Americans and one Iranian civilian). The American bodies were later returned to the United States and buried at various locations across the country. The 44 Iranian civilians taken prisoner on the bus were released and subsequently gave eyewitness accounts of the operation.
Casualties
The eight servicemen who died included three Marines and five Air Force personnel. On 25 April 1980, Major General Robert M. Bond read a message from President Jimmy Carter at a memorial service commemorating them in Niceville, Florida. A memorial honoring them was erected in the Arlington National Cemetery and Carter attended a memorial service there with the families on 9 May. Three of the servicemen who died – Maj. Richard Bakke, Maj. Harold Lewis Jr., and Sgt. Joel Mayo – were buried in the Arlington National Cemetery in a grave marked by a common headstone, located about 25 feet from the group memorial. In addition, five servicemen were injured, including USMC Majors Jim Schaefer, pilot, and Les Petty, co-pilot.
The eight US Servicemen who died in (failed) Operation Eagle Claw
Operation Eagle Claw Memorial in Arlington National Cemetery
Conclusion
In the context of the Iranian Revolution, Iran’s new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, stated that the mission had been stopped by an act of God (“angels of God”) who had foiled the U.S. mission in order to protect Iran and his new Islamist government. Ruhollah Khomeini in a speech after the incident, credited God with throwing sand to protect Iran. He said:
Who crushed Mr. Carter’s helicopters? We did? The sands did! They were God’s agents. Wind is God’s agent … These sands are agents of God. They can try again!
The embassy hostages were subsequently scattered across Iran to preclude any second rescue attempt.
President Carter continued to attempt to secure the hostages’ release before his presidency’s end. On 20 January 1981, minutes after Carter’s term ended, the 52 US captives held in Iran were released, ending the 444-day Iran hostage crisis. and were released on 20 January 1981, minutes after Ronald Reagan had taken the oath of office after winning the election against Carter.
RH-53D helicopter rotor remnant from Operation Eagle Claw on display in the former US Embassy in Tehran
KWK_23-8-23
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