KKS Perera …. responding to a circular request from The Editor, TPS, for “Thoughts and/or Lessons for the World from the Consequences of the Indian Government’s Military Intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987″ ... ………with highlights and photographs being the work of the Editor’s hand.
History seldom unfolds in neat moral binaries. The crisis of 1987 between India and Sri Lanka was not simply about humanitarian concern for Tamil civilians, nor solely about ethnic conflict within the island. It was also deeply shaped by Cold War geopolitics, regional insecurity, and strategic rivalry. To understand the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, one must situate it within India’s broader anxieties at the time, including its suspicion of American influence in South Asia and its concern over strategic assets such as Trincomalee harbour.
During the 1980s, India maintained a distinctly non-aligned but Soviet-leaning posture and remained wary of expanding U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. The government of J. R. Jayewardene pursued closer ties with Western powers, including the United States, which raised alarms in New Delhi. From India’s perspective, Sri Lanka’s openness to Western economic and security engagement carried potential strategic risks. Trincomalee harbour, one of the finest natural deep-water ports in the region, held particular significance. Indian policymakers feared that if Colombo deepened defence or strategic cooperation with Washington, Trincomalee could eventually become accessible to American naval interests. In Cold War calculations, that possibility was unacceptable.
Thus, India’s intervention was influenced not only by domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu and concern for Sri Lankan Tamils, but also by strategic determination to prevent external powers from gaining a foothold in what India regarded as its sphere of influence. New Delhi sought assurances that Sri Lankan territory would not be used for activities prejudicial to Indian security interests. The Accord included provisions and accompanying exchanges that addressed such concerns.
At the same time, India desired political arrangements in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces that would stabilise the region under structures compatible with Indian influence. The devolution framework embedded in the Accord aimed to create a provincial administration that could address Tamil grievances while remaining within a united Sri Lanka. Critics argue that New Delhi hoped such an arrangement would produce a leadership in the North and East that was cooperative with, or at least not hostile to, Indian strategic interests. Whether described as “control” or “stability,” India clearly intended to shape outcomes in its immediate neighbourhood.
The deterioration of Indo-Lankan relations before 1987 further aggravated tensions. The Sri Lankan government’s rejection of India’s humanitarian flotilla, the strong rhetoric of key ministers, and the nationalist mobilisation against Indian influence deepened mistrust. India’s subsequent airdrop of supplies over Jaffna was both a humanitarian signal and a strategic assertion of regional primacy. The deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force followed, transforming diplomatic pressure into physical presence.
Yet India’s strategic calculations encountered the unpredictable dynamics of local politics. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, initially expected to cooperate in the disarmament process, resisted and ultimately fought Indian forces. What began as an intervention partly justified on humanitarian and regional stability grounds evolved into a costly military entanglement. The backlash within Sri Lanka was intense, symbolised by the assault on Rajiv Gandhi during his ceremonial visit and culminating years later in his assassination by an LTTE suicide bomber in India.
When compared to later geopolitical confrontations, such as U.S. strategies toward Iran following the revolution led by Ruhollah Khomeini and policies under Donald Trump, Sri Lanka’s 1987 episode reveals a distinctive feature: it combined regional security anxiety, domestic political pressure, and fear of great-power encroachment into a single combustible moment. India’s actions were driven not merely by events inside Sri Lanka, but by apprehension that Colombo’s Western alignment could alter the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean.
The lesson is not that regional powers inevitably act out of hostility, but that security fears often magnify perceived threats. For India in 1987, a pro-Western Sri Lanka with potential American access to Trincomalee represented a strategic vulnerability. Intervention was, in part, an attempt to pre-empt that possibility and to ensure a friendly or manageable political order in the island’s sensitive northern and eastern regions.
For contemporary observers, including Americans and others reflecting on global interventions, the episode underscores how great powers react strongly to perceived encroachments in their immediate spheres of influence. Strategic geography matters. Harbours, sea lanes, and regional alignments can carry weight equal to ideological or humanitarian concerns. Yet the Sri Lankan case also demonstrates the risks of overreach: interventions undertaken to secure influence may instead generate resistance, instability, and long-term repercussions beyond original calculations.
Ultimately, the 1987 crisis was as much about geopolitical rivalry and strategic fear as it was about ethnic conflict. Understanding that complexity helps illuminate not only Sri Lanka’s past but also the enduring patterns of power politics in contested regions around the world.
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Indian Air Force helicopters, incl. prob. Soviet-made MI 8’s, & jeep of IPKF-Indian Peacekeeping Forces. (Photo by Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images)
Applause from Michael Roberts, 3 March 2026
Thank you, KKS. You have sharpened my understandings of the situation then, while also indicating the dangers associated with great power politico-military interventions in other territrories in complex circumstances.
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ALSO NOTE
Madhur Sharma .… https://thuppahis.com/2024/11/12/rajiv-gandhis-reasoning-behind-the-ipkf-operation/
Michael Roberts ….. http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/05/ground-realities-in-sri-lanka-expose.html
Wikipedia …… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_intervention_in_the_Sri_Lankan_civil_war
Rohan Gunaratna …. (1997). International & Regional Security Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency, AABC for International Studies. ISBN 955-95060-0-5
Eric Bailey ……. http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/05/decency-in-war-lost-art.html
COMMENT From SACHI SRI KANTHA in Japan sent via Email, 4 March 2026:
“March 7, 2026
I enjoyed reading this version of K.K.S. Perera, about India’s intervention in Sri Lanka, in 1987. Yes, concern of Trincomalee and cold war calculus is correct to the dot. We cannot ignore how the SL government functioned, during the giddy days of post-1982 Referendum, that postponed the parliamentary elections until 1988.
To be precise, one shouldn’t miss the calculus of old fox J.R. Jayewardane though. He had his own design of managing his successor aspirants. In my count, there were four, at that time. Premadasa, Lalith Athulathmudali, Gamini Dissanayake and Ronnie de Mel. Among these four, two (Gamini and Ronnie) supported the Indo-SL accord, while two (Premadasa and Athulathmudali) opposed the Indo-SL accord.
Among these four, it was Athulathmudali, who was favored by JR – because he was nominated to the position of Minister of National Security to deal with the Tamil militant problem.
And what did the Indian mandarins thought about Athulathmudali’s resolve?
We have it, in J.N.Dixit’s memoir ‘Assignment Colombo’ (1998). And Dixit was the chief guy, who negotiated the July 1987 Accord. In his memoir (pp. 316-217), Dixit had written in a long paragraph the following about Athulathmudali. Excerpts:
“Lalith Athulathmudali considered himself a combination of Machiavelli and Bismark…He was clear in his mind that his destiny was to be the President of Sri Lanka. He was intellectually bright, lucid in articulation. He was clever, but I dare say he was not wise… While professing friendship with India, he was a committed advocate of Sri Lanka developing relations with Pakistan, the United States and Israel, which created the strategic environment provoking Mrs Gandhi to generate pressure on the Jayewardene Government.”