SWRD Bandaranaike: 𝑾𝒂𝒔 𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝑨𝒅𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂’𝒔 Long-Term Strategy?

S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike first rose to island wide prominence when he entered the First State Council of Ceylon in 1931 as Member for Veyangoda, elected unopposed. A famous photograph published in “The Ceylon Daily News” showed him in national dress beside his father, Sir Solomon Dias Bandaranaike, clad in Edwardian style, standing at the foot of the State Council building. It was not admiration but ridicule. From the beginning, he stood between two worlds..

According to James Manor in Expedient Utopian, during his first term Bandaranaike “hankered impatiently” after ministerial office. In the Second State Council he secured what he wanted. He became Minister of Local Administration in 1936, handling Local Government, Lands, Settlement and Survey. It was an important portfolio. It brought him into direct contact with rural Ceylon.

He remained a Minister for eleven years, serving alongside D. S. Senanayake, John Kotelawala, C. W. W. Kannangara and D. B. Jayatilaka. Compared to his colleagues, what major development scheme bears his imprint from that long ministerial tenure? He was a silver-tongued orator. He was charismatic. But he was not methodical. His Oxford training did not translate into administrative brilliance. As B. P. Peiris, the Cabinet Secretary records in his memoirs, punctuality and disciplined office routine were not his strengths. He was more a politician than an administrator.

When constitutional reforms introduced the parliamentary system in 1947, D. S. Senanayake was elected Prime Minister and SWRD was offered the Portfolio of Finance (which ultimately was accepted by J. R. Jayewardene). SWRD declined it. Instead, he insisted on retaining Local Government. That decision was not accidental. As J. L. Fernando, the Lake House journalist observed, Bandaranaike used that office to organize the rural backbone of the country. He cultivated local bodies. He mobilised support among the Ayurvedic physicians who carried immense influence among village communities. He built networks quietly.

Less than a decade later, under the banner of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, he swept the polls. The very rural masses he had courted during his years in Local Administration carried him to power.

Was Banda a competent leader? If we measure him as an administrator, no. Fifteen years in office as a Minister and three years as Prime Minister produced little that was structurally transformative. He lacked method and consistency.

If we measure him as a political strategist, the answer changes. He understood the pulse of rural Ceylon long before others did. He built patiently. He waited. And when the moment came, he knew exactly where his strength lay.

He was not a master builder of institutions. He was a master builder of political momentum. This is what made him Prime Minister in 1956 with the “popular trend” of “Sinhala Only” then. The political fire he helped ignite did not remain contained. It consumed him. When his “policies” and momentum failed, he was assassinated by a monk (සඟ) who was a physician (වෙද) and teacher (ගුරු).

Fernando, J.L., (1965), Bandaranaike Legacies, The Times of Ceylon Press

Manor, James,(1989), Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon, University of Cambridge Press

Peiris, B.P., (2007), Memoirs of a Cabinet Secretary, Sarasavi Publishers