Rohan Gunaratne in Substack, 23 August 2026, with the above title …
Iran’s Shia crescent – its group of partners and proxies – have taken a severe beating. Nonetheless Iran, especially the IRGC, is determined to fight back.
The Shift
From the Strait of Hormuz, the center of gravity of the Middle East conflict has shifted to the Red Sea. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) has directed Houthi Movement’s Ansarallah to destabilise its enemies. In addition to the U.S. and Israel, Iran’s key enemies are the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.
Tensions and fighting between Yemen’s Houthi movement and Saudi Arabia have sharply escalated, effectively ending the relative calm established by the 2022 UN-brokered truce. Houthi cross-border drone and missile strikes targeting Saudi energy and airport infrastructure have met with retaliatory coalition air strikes, pushing Yemen toward renewed full-scale conflict. Saudi Arabia previously led a regional military coalition starting in March 2015 to support Yemen’s internationally recognized government after the Houthis took over the capital, Sanaa. An informal calm held since 2022, but regional ripples from broader Middle Eastern conflicts and clashes over blockades strained the status quo. Coalition-backed Yemeni government strikes on Sanaa Airport prompted the Houthis to announce a naval and economic blockade against Saudi Arabia, hitting back with a wave of anti-infrastructure and maritime drone attacks. The Houthis claimed responsibility for multiple drone and missile operations targeting Saudi regional assets, including facilities in Najran and Red Sea shipping lanes near Mocha. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched dozens of active ground and air operations targeting Houthi strongholds and military infrastructure in western and northern Yemen. Aid organizations warn that a full return to hostilities threatens to worsen what remains one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises.
The Shift
From the Strait of Hormuz, the center of gravity of the Middle East conflict has shifted to the Red Sea. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) has directed Houthi Movement’s Ansarallah to destabilise its enemies. In addition to the U.S. and Israel, Iran’s key enemies are the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.
Tensions and fighting between Yemen’s Houthi movement and Saudi Arabia have sharply escalated, effectively ending the relative calm established by the 2022 UN-brokered truce. Houthi cross-border drone and missile strikes targeting Saudi energy and airport infrastructure have met with retaliatory coalition air strikes, pushing Yemen toward renewed full-scale conflict. Saudi Arabia previously led a regional military coalition starting in March 2015 to support Yemen’s internationally recognized government after the Houthis took over the capital, Sanaa. An informal calm held since 2022, but regional ripples from broader Middle Eastern conflicts and clashes over blockades strained the status quo. Coalition-backed Yemeni government strikes on Sanaa Airport prompted the Houthis to announce a naval and economic blockade against Saudi Arabia, hitting back with a wave of anti-infrastructure and maritime drone attacks. The Houthis claimed responsibility for multiple drone and missile operations targeting Saudi regional assets, including facilities in Najran and Red Sea shipping lanes near Mocha. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched dozens of active ground and air operations targeting Houthi strongholds and military infrastructure in western and northern Yemen. Aid organizations warn that a full return to hostilities threatens to worsen what remains one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises.
The Context
The regional architecture of the Middle East is rapidly changing. In just 3 weeks, Saudi Arabia secured 3 major strategic breakthroughs:
- July 22: Saudi- US Civil Nuclear Agreement
- July 30: Saudi led Maritime Security Alliance
- August 7: Mecca Defense Pact with Pakistan and Turkey
In response to the rapidly changing regional architecture, the Ansarallah of the Houthi movement formally declared a naval navigation restriction on Saudi shipping on July 20, 2026. It is the IRGC which has activated Ansarallah to strike Saudi Arabia, its interests in Yemen and at sea. The Saudi-led coalition conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting Houthi military camps and naval sites in western Yemen.
Background
Israel is exercising unprecedented military dominance and reshaping traditional regional balance lines, though analysts debate whether it functions as a true regional “hegemon” or leader. Aggressive military offensives against adversaries in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria have severely weakened the Iran-backed “axis of resistance” and expanded Israel’s operational reach.
Factors supporting Israeli regional primacy are military dominance, degraded adversaries, and strategic initiatives.
Unilateral cross-border actions and strikes by Israel against core adversaries have decimated traditional deterrence frameworks.[1] Decisive setbacks inflicted on regional militia networks by Israel and direct actions involving Iran have shifted tactical dynamics. Israel increasingly dictates its own security terms rather than merely reacting to immediate threats.[2] Limits to hegemony and emerging counterweights are lasting dependencies, counter alliances, and asymmetric vulnerabilities. Israel remains heavily reliant on the United States for advanced military resupply, diplomatic shielding, and intelligence integration.[3] Regional competitors—such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan—are forming formal cooperative counter-blocs like the Mecca Defense Pact to secure mutual defense independent of Israeli or Western security umbrellas. Persistent trade disruptions, non-state maritime threats (such as the Houthis), and broader economic constraints of continuous multi-front warfare limit complete regional control.[4]
Timeline
On August 9, 2026, the Houthi Movement’s Ansarallah continued their escalatory attacks in the region with the launching of dozens of drones, WBIEDs (Water-Borne Improvised Explosive Device), and missiles against the Internationally Recongnized Government (IRG)-held port city of Mocha in the contested Al-Hodeidah governorate, claiming to target Saudi forces there.[5] While IRG forces managed to intercept at least 11 attack drones, the attack killed seven people – including three civilians – injured up to 30, and caused material damage to the city’s port and other infrastructure in the area. On the same day, the Houthis also launched drones targeting an Aramco oil facility in Jizan port city in Saudi Arabia, causing a fire.
This ACLED map illustrates key conflict events and spatial patterns between Houthi’s Ansarallah and Saudi Arabia over a four-week period, tracking attacks on energy infrastructure, maritime shipping, and aviation hubs.
- On July 13–14, 2026, Saudi Arabia conducts airstrikes on Sanaa airport and Sadah, prompting Houthi retaliation via drone and missile attacks directed at Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia.[6]
- On July 15–23, 2026, Houthis Movement’s Ansarallah announce a naval blockade against Saudi shipping and launch strikes on Saudi oil tankers, including the first confirmed attack on a Saudi ship (Encelia) during this escalation on July 22, 2026.[7]
- On July 25–26, 2026, Ansarallah of the Houthi movement targeted Saudi energy and infrastructure facilities in Yanbu and Jizan with drones and missiles. Saudi air defenses intercepted incoming projectiles as Houthi strikes hit targets associated with Aramco in Yanbu and Jizan. This followed a self-declared Houthi naval blockade on Saudi shipping and triggered retaliatory Saudi-led coalition airstrikes on Houthi military positions in Yemen, including Hodeida and Kamaran Island. Ansarallah of the Houthi Movement continue targeting Saudi-linked ships, leading to further Saudi airstrikes inside Yemen.[8]
- On July 25–26, 2026, Houthi Movement’s Ansarallah target energy infrastructure with missile and drone launches towards Yanbu and Jazan facilities, triggering additional Saudi retaliatory strikes.
- On July 27– 9 August 9, 2026, Ansarullah of the Houthi Movement intensify attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, culminating in an August 9, 2026 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Jazan refinery, as well as strikes on Mocha port and city in Yemen that killed seven people and damaged civilian infrastructure.[9]
Iran is facing a crisis from within and from overseas. With the IRGC attacking 12 countries in the Middle East, most governments in the region are gradually turning against Iran.
How Will the War End?
How the conflict in the Middle East will end remains uncertain following the collapse of a temporary U.S.–Iran truce and ongoing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz. With formal diplomacy stalled, a lasting resolution will likely depend on a combination of strained economic pressure, shifting regional alignments, and renewed negotiation frameworks.
With the U.S. shifting toward heavy financial sanctions and blockades, and Iran facing immense infrastructure damage, both sides may eventually find military or maritime escalation too costly to sustain.
Iranian leadership has signaled openness to ending the conflict from a “position of strength”, conditional on lifting oil sanctions, unfreezing assets, and securing international guarantees, which could serve as baseline points if back-channel talks restart.
Third-party powers like China or regional intermediaries may step in to broker a new maritime and security framework for the Gulf once direct belligerents realize a total military victory is unachievable.
The Strait of Hormuz will remain a flashpoint in the immediate to the mid term…………….. Disagreements over who regulates traffic, navigation safety, and military access in the Strait continue to trigger direct counter-strikes.
The U.S. and its regional allies maintain hardline stances regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional proxy networks, conflicting directly with Tehran’s demands for reparations and recognition of its regional influence.
Ongoing hostilities risk leaving Iran’s regime more isolated and paranoid, while long-term hostility toward Israel and shifting Gulf state dynamics complicate a comprehensive regional settlement.
Iran is facing a crisis from within and from overseas. With the IRGC attacking 12 countries in the Middle East, most governments in the region are gradually turning against Iran. If the U.S. and Israel work with the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East, a military response will weaken Iran’s capacity to sustain the fight.
Conclusion
The developments in the Middle East is a direct result of the U.S. and Israel-Iran War starting on February 28, 2026. While Israel has emerged as the leading power in the Middle East, Iranian power is receding. Iran’s Shia crescent – its group of partners and proxies – have taken a severe beating. In addition to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups in Gaza that have taken a severe beating from Israel, the Shia militias Lebanese Hezbollah and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq has suffered appreciably. Iran’s ally Bashar al Asad in Syria is no longer in power.
Nonetheless Iran, especially the IRGC, is determined to fight back. Although it is debatable, Islamabad’s MOU favours Iran. Similarly, the MOU between Iran and Oman favours Iran. If Gulf countries capitulates to Iranian strikes and pressure, US may shift its bases from Gulf countries to Israel.
As the emerging power in the region, Israel is establishing a new regional order. Led by Saudi Arabia, Muslim countries are creating a Sunni Muslim alliance. Saudi Arabia wants to challenge Iran after its power has receded. Israel is dominating the regional order – beating Hamas, bringing Hezbollah to its knees through the trilateral framework between U.S., Lebanon and Israel, and harnessing the Abraham Accords to strengthen and build relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Somaliland and Sudan.
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Rohan Gunaratna is a Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University. He is a trainer for law enforcement, national security and military counter terrorism units; and is the author and editor of over 30 books, including ‘The Handbook of Terrorism in the Middle East’.
[1] https://ict.org.il/strategic-leverage-and-regional-realignment-iran-israel-and-the-new-balance-of-power-in-the-middle-east/
[2] https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-rising-joint-israel-us-strategic-fortunes-in-the-middle-east/
[3] https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-rising-joint-israel-us-strategic-fortunes-in-the-middle-east/
[4] https://ict.org.il/strategic-leverage-and-regional-realignment-iran-israel-and-the-new-balance-of-power-in-the-middle-east/
[5] https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/how-have-houthi-saudi-tensions-evolved-last-month
[6] https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/how-have-houthi-saudi-tensions-evolved-last-month
[7] https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/how-have-houthi-saudi-tensions-evolved-last-month
[8] https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/how-have-houthi-saudi-tensions-evolved-last-month
[9] https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/how-have-houthi-saudi-tensions-evolved-last-month