Jehan Perera in The Island, 28 October 2025, where the title runs thua: “Barometer confirms window for political settlement”... with the highlights here being impositions by The Editor, Thuppahi
The danger is that, as Shakespeare pointed out, time does not wait. Internationally, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has provided it space to resolve issues domestically. The latest resolution on Sri Lanka gives the country two more years to fulfil its commitments to accountability, truth-seeking, and reparations. The resolution explicitly acknowledges that national mechanisms can address these issues, de-emphasising the need for an international process. It is a kind of diplomatic reprieve that the world is willing to let Sri Lanka find its own way but also the right way. On the other hand, if nothing tangible happens within the next two years, the international mood could shift sharply. The next UNHRC resolution may be stronger and demand direct intervention or international mechanisms once again to deal with internal matters.
The recently released Sri Lanka Barometer 2025, a project sponsored by the European Union and the German government (www.srilankabarometer.lk), adds weight to the need for urgency. Conducted countrywide, it offers an empirically grounded picture of reconciliation in this time of political transition. Its findings show both danger and possibility. According to the survey findings, political trust is lowest in the Northern and Eastern provinces compared with the other seven provinces. It showed that political trust has risen nationally from 5.9 (2023) to 6.9 (2025), the highest since 2020. However, trust declined in both the Northern and Eastern provinces, falling to 6.5 and 6.2 respectively in 2025 down from 6.9 and 6.5 in 2023. Respondents in the north and east reported persistent feelings of marginalisation and unfulfilled justice. Many expressed the view that promises made by successive governments have not been translated into action, and that the lack of provincial council elections has left them without a political voice.
Positive Findings
On the positive side, the survey identifies a broad national openness to reconciliation amid change. The research finds that a majority of Sri Lankans across ethnic and religious lines believe reconciliation is possible if it is linked to visible improvements in governance, justice, and livelihoods. Equally significant is the expanding civic space for reconciliation under the present government. Local civil society organisations, community leaders, and youth groups are participating more actively in dialogue and advocacy than in previous years. The survey also showed that people are increasingly willing to join reconciliation-related activities when these are led by credible local actors rather than by partisan or external ones. Despite the decline in trust levels in the North and East, people in these two provinces reported the highest level of confidence in their own ability to engage politically, suggesting strong civic motivation and agency at community level. The national average was 6.7 (up from 6.1 in 2023) but in the Northern and Eastern provinces the score was 7.2. The report states “The highest levels of internal political efficacy in 2025 are recorded in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (with mean scores of 7.2), which may be linked to the higher-than-average active citizenship observed in these regions.” This demonstrates that a bottom-up approach can succeed if matched by political leadership from above.
The message from the Barometer is there is still space for reconciliation, but it is narrowing. The Barometer shows a national rise in trust and optimism, but a clear divergence in the North and East, where trust and responsiveness are eroding, although civic confidence and participation remain strong there. This suggests that the public in war-affected areas continues to believe in change but not yet in the state’s will or capacity to deliver it. The longer justice and devolution are delayed, the harder it becomes to sustain public trust. When grievances are left unaddressed, they are easily exploited by extremist actors on all sides. The voice of frustration and demand for justice comes not only from the north and east but also from ethnic and religious minority communities across the country. From Kattankudy to Katuwapitiya, from Valvettithurai to Digana where communities continue to seek truth and accountability. The continued delay in addressing these grievances deepens distrust in institutions and erodes faith in the rule of law.
The government, with its parliamentary majority and its popular mandate, is uniquely placed to reverse this trend. It needs to demonstrate commitment by restoring the democratic process at the provincial level, holding provincial council elections, and ensuring that transitional-justice commitments to missing persons are implemented in a way that people can see and feel. The time to deliver on commitments is now, not later. It would be pertinent to note that majorities and mandates can be fleeting as they were with the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government. The government’s current strength will not last indefinitely. Political goodwill erodes quickly when people do not see results. If this moment is allowed to pass, it may not return any time soon.
Lost Opportunities
The history of modern Sri Lanka is one of lost opportunities to address the ethnic conflict that has dogged the country since its Independence. In 1977, President J. R. Jayewardene came to office with a five-sixths parliamentary majority and a manifesto that recognised Tamil grievances. He pledged a roundtable conference to address them but delayed too long. In 2015 the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government started strong, formed a constitutional assembly out of parliament, but then ran out of steam. The question, today, is not whether the present government has the power to act but whether it has the vision, commitment and courage to use it.
At the heart of Sri Lanka’s unresolved conflict lies the question of power-sharing. The 13th Amendment to the constitution, which introduced the provincial council system, remains the most viable basis for a political solution. It offers limited autonomy within a unitary framework, balancing the desire for self-administration in the North and East with the need to maintain the unity of the state. In a recent article, Dr Dayan Jayatilleka has argued that the provincial council system is not simply an Indian construct but an indigenous model that goes back to the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 which sought to establish “Regional Councils” (with power to levy taxes). He has also summarised the reason why Sri Lanka needs devolution of power. He writes “We need provincial-level devolution because the reality of the island’s demographic composition and disposition is such that we must either have a level playing-field constitutionally, guaranteeing equality with no built-in privilege for any community (e.g., France, Singapore), or we must share power between the centre and the provinces which contain non-majority constituent communities in compact near-contiguity.” …………………………… (https://www.ft.lk/columns/Electoral-reactivation-of-provincial-councils-is-an-urgent-systemic-imperative/4-783312)
Sri Lanka stands today at a rare intersection of political will, social expectation, and international opportunity. The people voted for system change. The government has both the power and the legitimacy to deliver. The UNHRC has extended a window for domestic action. Civil society is ready, as the Sri Lanka Barometer confirms, to participate in rebuilding trust. What remains is the political decision to move from intent to implementation. Holding Provincial Council elections, empowering local institutions, acknowledging the suffering of all communities, and demonstrating that justice is for all are steps that can make national reconciliation a reality. The time to act is now, not next year, and certainly not after another round of debates or delays that can drag on for years.
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THOUGHTS From Thuppahiya, 31 October 2025
Located as I am in Australia, I am out of touchwith the political currents swirling around in Sri Lanka. I have deep respect for Jehan: in his moderation and his deep commitments to the land and its peoples.
That stressed, let me raise a radical set of questions pertaining to the provincial boundary system and the asssociated electoral baselines that underpin his discussion. This line of questioning is based on the maps comosed by my Peradeniay colleagues, Percy Silva and Kusuma guanwardena as important elements in the book People Inbetween (1989, Sarasavi).
The maps display the flow of people to Greater Metropolitan Colombo (a patternt hat has probably increased and deepened between 1989 and 2025). Thus, the Sinhalese majority is much less a majority within these boundaries. Add to this phenomemon three other aspects: the presence of several minority ethnic groups in this arena: namely, the Malays, Colombo Chetties, Bharathas, Sindhis, Goans, Borahs, Parsis.
Add to this the demographic weight of the SL Tamils and the Indian Tamils within the Greater Metropolitan arena
THEN, infuse into this dimension of thought the economic and political clout wielded by (A) the SL Tamils in particular and(B) the other minority groups referred to above via their activities in such institutions as the Chamber of Commerce & Orient Club and the set of recreational Clubs (including the Tamil Union, SSC, CR & FC, CH &FC, etc etc). It is within the portals of such institituions that influence of a wide-ranging character are wielded.
However well-meaning, without factoring in such dimensions of the socio-political area, one’s reasoning is likely to be skewed.
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